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methods to mitigate three different social dilemmas in environmental economics.
The first chapter uses a laboratory experiment to test the relative efficacies of the prob-
ability and severity of sanctions in reducing socially suboptimal extraction from a common
property resource. Keeping expected penalties constant, the paper tests whether probabil-
ity or severity is a more powerful deterrent under four quota regimes governing resource
utilization.
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to evaluate the performance of community-based resource management programs in Africa.
These programs are intended to dis-incentivize poaching of wild animals by providing in-
dividuals a share in the revenues generated by national park services like eco-tourism and
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The third chapter discusses a laboratory experiment conducted in Qatar that aims to
understand the effectiveness of priming religious identity and national identity on individuals'
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1 Introduction
A typical social dilemma is a situation where self-interest maximization leads to actions
that are detrimental to social welfare (Dawes, 1980). Such situations can arise in a variety
of contexts, especially in environmental choices where there are divergences between pri-
vate and social benefits and costs. This dissertation examines methods to overcome three
social dilemmas.
The first chapter formulates a classic social dilemma using a laboratory experiment
that models extraction from a common property resource. Self-interest maximizing extrac-
tion by an individual creates negative externalities on others. In this context, the experi-
ment tests the relative efficacy of two policy levers, (i) the probability of detection, and (ii)
the severity of sanctions, on deterring socially sub-optimal extraction from the resource.
There is little evidence on the trade-off between these deterrence parameters in resource
extraction contexts. This analysis contributes to filling that gap by exogenously varying
the quota regime and deterrence parameters, while keeping expected penalties constant.
Controlling for individual risk attitudes, the results show that (i) monitoring and sanc-
tions reduce socially detrimental harvest, (ii) a higher probability of monitoring is approxi-
mately twice as effective as an equivalent increase in the severity of sanctions.
Moving from a stylized experiment to a naturally-occurring social dilemma, the sec-
ond chapter studies benefit-sharing institutions that attempt to mitigate loss of wildlife.
Using secondary data and quasi-experimental techniques, the paper identifies the effect of
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programs on elephant popula-
tions in Africa. CBNRM programs aim to dis-incentivize illegal hunting of wild animals by
sharing benefits from wildlife services with local communities. Though the number of these
programs has grown over time, there is a lack of sound empirical evidence regarding their
performance. Results show that while CBNRM programs have had positive long-term im-
pacts, the magnitude of the effect depends significantly on other characteristics such as
ethno-linguistic fragmentation and whether a country has been a signatory to the interna-
1
tional ban on ivory trade.
The third chapter uses experiments conducted in Qatar to test the effect of priming
individuals' religious or national identity on their pro-social preferences. Voluntary con-
tributions to a charity are used as the measure of pro-sociality. This chapter is meant to
complement a large field experiment on a major social dilemma in Qatar  reducing emis-
sions from fossil-fuel based energy use. Qatar has one of the highest levels of per-capita
energy consumption in the world. Randomized treatment messages designed to increase
energy efficiency and promote energy conservation are currently being delivered to cell-
phones of approximately 5,000 households in Qatar. The treatment messages are informed
by priors formed through the analysis of these experiments.
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the broad implications for research and
policymaking aimed at mitigation of social dilemmas, and some avenues for future work.
2
2 Deterring Extraction from the Commons1
2.1 Introduction
Resource management programs use monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to enforce
rules governing harvest from common pool resources. These rules often take the form of
allowable quotas on harvest. This paper tests the relative efficacies of two policy levers,
namely the probability and severity of sanctions, on deterring socially suboptimal harvest
from common pool resources under four alternative quota regimes.
The experiment is designed as an extraction game, where individuals choose how much
to harvest from a shared resource while facing known probabilities of detection and sever-
ity of penalties, conditional on being detected. Each combination of deterrence parameters
is implemented under four alternative quota regimes. In the first regime, the quota is fixed
at zero harvest. In the second, sanctions are implemented if an individual harvests more
than the exogenous average harvest level in the previous period. In the third regime, a
fee-bate mechanism is used that imposes sanctions on individuals who harvest more while
rewarding individuals who harvest less than the exogenous quota. The fourth regime endo-
genizes the quota by implementing sanctions and rewards around the average harvest level
in the current period.
Prior work has examined the tradeoffs between the probability of detection and sever-
ity of sanctions in strategic choice environments, i.e. where individual actions impose ex-
ternalities on others. Anderson and Stafford (2003) finds that the severity of sanctions is
more effective in reducing free-riding on others' contributions to a public good than an
equivalent increase in the probability of detection. Murphy and Stranlund (2007) finds
1I would like to express my sincere gratitude to James Cox, Michael Price, Andreas Lange and Spencer
Banzhaf for their valuable feedback. The paper has benefited through comments received from Vjollca
Sadiraj, Garth Heutel, John Whitehead, John Stranlund, Lata Gangadharan, Daan van Soest, Sarah
Jacobson, Nicholas Flores, and Christopher Timmins at various stages of the project. Feedback from
participants at the Colorado University Workshop for Environmental and Resource Economics 2018, the
Southern Economic Association Annual Meetings in 2018 and 2016, and the FEEM-VIU Summer School
on Field Experiments in Environmental Economics 2016 is greatly appreciated. The experiments were
funded through the Andrew Young School Dissertation Fellowship.
3
that the effects of the two parameters are not discernibly different. In individual choice
environments, Friesen (2012) finds that increasing the severity of sanctions is more effec-
tive in increasing compliance to a regulation than increasing the probability of detection.
However, several studies on tax compliance comprehensively reviewed in Alm (2012) find
that the probability of detection is a more effective deterrent.
In terms of experiment design, this paper differentiates itself from earlier work by using
an extraction game instead of a voluntary contribution game. This is done for a closer ap-
proximation of behavior in common property resource utilization. Unlike some earlier work
(Anderson and Stafford, 2003, Murphy and Stranlund, 2007), this paper uses a standard
risk elicitation task (Eckel and Grossman, 2002) to control for individual risk attitudes.
The alternative incentivized quota regimes including the fee-bate mechanism also represent
a development on existing literature on sanctions in common pool resources.
In terms of the econometric analysis, this paper contributes to the literature through
an explicit examination of heterogeneities in treatment effects on two margins. First, treat-
ment effects are differentiated by type of strategic agent, including free riders, altruists and
conditional cooperators. Second, the paper analyzes the effects of sanctions and rewards
on both the extensive and the intensive margins, i.e. separately estimating effects on the
decision of harvesting any positive amount versus nothing, and the decision of how much
to harvest conditional on harvesting a positive amount.
The primary result from the experiments is that an increase in the probability of be-
ing monitored is significantly more effective in reducing harvest from the shared resource,
compared to an equivalent increase in severity of sanctions. The difference in the effects is
weakest when sanctions are imposed around a quota that varies across rounds but is sim-
ilarly strong in all other quota regimes. A higher harvest quota is associated with a less-
than-proportionate increase in harvest levels, showing that people respond as expected to
an increase in exogenous quotas. The results hold even after controlling for individual risk
aversion and standard demographic characteristics. Conditional on baseline harvest levels,
4
sanctions are found to be most effective on free riders, less effective on conditional cooper-
ators and sometimes even backfire on altruists.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of re-
lated studies on sanction mechanisms designed to mitigate social dilemmas. Section 2.3
presents the theoretical model of individual-level harvest decisions. Section 2.4 describes
the experiment design, parameterization of treatments, and procedures used. Section 2.5
describes the results including the analysis of treatment effects by type of strategic agent,
and heterogeneous effects on the intensive and extensive margins. Section 2.6 concludes
with a discussion and implications for environmental policy design.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper builds on earlier work on sanctions in social dilemmas and tests of deter-
rence in individual decision-making situations. Some of the important papers and findings
from these two strands of literature are described below.
2.2.1 Sanctions in Social Dilemmas
Although not directly addressing the relative effects of deterrence parameters, a num-
ber of studies using experiments have found that monitoring and sanctions can increase
cooperation in social dilemmas. Fehr and Gächter (2000) is one of the first to test the
effects of peer-monitoring and sanctioning opportunities on public good provision. They
found that individuals depart from Nash equilibrium prediction by incurring costs to pun-
ish other players in a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game. Moreover, mecha-
nisms leveraging both fines and rewards have been shown to increase cooperation in public
goods games (Falkinger et al., 2000).
In earlier work on common pool resources, Ostrom et al. (1992) found that the threat
of sanctions can increase net yields, although communication is found to be more effective
as a means of increasing cooperation. Further exploring these findings, Nikiforakis (2008)
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shows evidence that allowing for a second round of punishment opportunities reduces pun-
ishment of free riders in the first round and mitigates the efficiency gains from peer pun-
ishment found in earlier work.
Compared to decentralized peer-punishment mechanisms, centralized sanctions can
generate welfare gains by crowding out vigilante punishment, and people are willing to
pay to hire a delegated police mechanism to enforce sanctions (Andreoni and Gee, 2012).
Adding more nuance to choice of sanctioning mechanism in social dilemmas, Zhang et al.
(2014) shows that individuals prefer centralized sanctions especially when the second-order
punishment opportunities are available. However, high up-front costs of formal sanctioning
institutions can dissuade individuals from choosing formal sanctions over informal peer-
punishment mechanisms (Kamei et al., 2015, Markussen et al., 2013). Another related
body of work tests the effects of deterrence in the context of games where one of a ran-
domly matched pair of players has the opportunity to steal money from their matched
partner (Harbaugh et al., 2013, Khadjavi et al., 2015, Laske et al., 2018, Schildberg-Hörisch
and Strassmair, 2010).
2.2.2 Deterrence in Individual Choice Experiments
The relative effects of deterrence have also been explored in individual choice experi-
ments, i.e. where one's actions do not result in externalities on others. The effects of prob-
ability and severity of sanctions are most often looked at in the literature on tax compli-
ance. Alm (2012) carries out an extensive review of theoretical and experimental work on
measuring and controlling tax evasion. The review suggests that probability of audits have
a greater deterrent effect than fines even when the two are equivalent. Moreover, individ-
uals often overweight low probabilities of audits, suggesting that behavioral factors like
probability weighting can play an important role. Some studies find that probability of
fines can be a greater deterrent than severity of fines when considering costly compliance
to a pre-specified regulation (Friesen, 2012). However, Bruner (2009) finds that risk averse
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subjects prefer an increase in the probability of a good outcome over an increase in the
reward from a lottery, while keeping the expected value constant. Using a laboratory ex-
periment with choices framed as whether to speed on a roadway, DeAngelo and Charness
(2012) find that when expected cost of punishment is high, individuals violate the rule less
when probability of detection is higher.
The existing literature, therefore, has mixed findings regarding the effectiveness of
deterrence in strategic choice environments. This paper builds on that body of work by
examining not only the effects of probability and severity of sanctions while controlling
for individual risk attitudes, but also the differences between alternative quota regimes
and fee-bat mechanisms that have not been studied in the context of resource extraction
games. Moreover, it also considers differences in the effects of sanctions and rewards along
two dimensions: (i) different strategic types identified in established work on social dilem-
mas like conditional cooperators, free riders and altruists, and (ii) decisions of an agent
on the intensive and extensive margin, i.e. the drivers of decisions regarding whether to
harvest any positive amount from the common pool versus deciding how much to harvest
conditional on harvesting a positive amount.
2.3 Model
This section describes the theoretical model on which the experiment is based. Each
individual has access to a private fund and a common fund. The amount in an individual's
private fund accrues only to them, while the amount in the common fund is shared equally
by all individuals in the same group. Individuals choose how much to take out from the
common fund to put into their individual fund. Individuals face a known probability that
their group's decision will be monitored. If the group is monitored an individual can be
sanctioned or rewarded based on their harvest level and a quota. In this model, monitor-
ing is costless and enforced by an external agency.
7
Notation
e is the initial endowment in each individual's private fund. hmax is the maximum
amount that can be harvested from the common fund. p is the probability of the group's
decision being reviewed. α indicates the severity of the penalty to be imposed, conditional
on being reviewed. M is the efficiency factor or multiplier, i.e. one unit in the private fund
is worth M units in the common fund. N is the number of agents in a group. hi is the
amount agent i harvests, where hi ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 10}. H0 is the quota from which sanc-
tions or rewards are calculated.
2.3.1 Payoffs, Fines, Rewards and Quota Regimes
The payoff from the extraction game without sanctions is:
pii = e+ hi +
M
N
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj) (1)
where e + hi represents the value of i's individual fund while
M
N
∑N
j=1(hmax − hj) rep-
resents the value accruing to i from the common fund. As long as M/N < 1 in this game,
each individual should extract the maximum possible to maximize their own payoff, while
the social optimum is to extract nothing.2
The fine or reward is based on differences between individual i's harvest and the quota.
f(hi) = hi −H0 if hi > H0
= 0 if hi ≤ H0 (2)
In the first quota regime, termed Fixed Quota Fines Only, H0 = 0. So, if a group
2The linear game does not predict social optima in the interior as would be the case with concave
earnings/yield functions. However, the effects of deterrence as posed in this paper can be answered with
linear games where the social optimum does not change, whereas individually rational strategies align with
the social optimum in treatments with sanctions and rewards, based on the risk preferences and the incen-
tives implemented. Further, the linear game maintains a clear prediction in the baseline especially when
variable or endogenous quotas are implemented.
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is monitored and an individual has taken out anything from the common fund, a fine is
imposed. The amount of the fine is the severity factor, α, times the fine function f(hi). In
the second quota regime, termed Variable Quota Fines Only, H0 is fixed at the group's
average harvest in the previous round.3 This value is exogenous to current period decisions
and is, therefore, treated as a constant.
In the third regime, termed Variable Quota with Feebate, the quota is still exogenous,
say H0. Individuals who harvest more than the quota are sanctioned while those who har-
vest less are rewarded. The amount of the fine or reward is still the difference between
harvest level and the quota times the severity factor, α.
f(hi) = hi −H0 (3)
In the fourth regime, termed Endogenous Quota with Feebate, the quota is the aver-
age harvest level among all the members of the group, i.e. H0 =
∑N
j=1 hj
N
. Individuals who
harvest more than the average are fined while those who harvest less are rewarded accord-
ing to the difference between harvest level and quota times the severity factor, α. This is a
stochastic version of the simple mechanism for efficient public good provision developed in
Falkinger et al. (2000) but applied to the extraction game.
f(hi) = hi −
∑N
j=1 hj
N
(4)
The Expected Value to agent i of harvesting hi from the common fund is:
EVi = p
[
e+ hi +
M
N
{
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
}
− αf(hi)
]
+ (1− p)
[
e+ hi +
M
N
{
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
}]
(5)
Assuming
∂hj
∂hi
= 0,
∂EVi
∂hi
= 1− αp− M
N
(6)
3This is reinforced using random rematching as described in Section 2.4.
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As shown in Appendix A, if 1 − αp > M/N , the optimal harvest level is hi = hmax ∀
i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N}.
Extending the model to Expected Utility maximization, risk averse agents (i) optimally
harvest 0, as long as 1−p
p(Nα−1) ≤ U
′(A)
U ′(B) ,
4 and (ii) react more to changes in severity of sanc-
tions (α) than to equivalent changes in probability of detection (p) as shown in Appendix
A.
2.4 Experiment Design
In the experiment, the decision to harvest from the common pool is designed as an ex-
traction game. At the start of each round, subjects are randomly assigned to groups of
four members (N = 4). A subject starts each round with 10 tokens in their Individual
Fund and each group starts with 40 tokens in their Group Fund which is shared equally
among all group members. A subject can choose to harvest any whole number of tokens
between 0 and 10 from the Group Fund (hmax = 10). A token in the Individual Fund
is worth 1 Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) to a subject while a token in the shared
Group Fund is worth 2 ECU (MPCR = 0.5). The dominant strategy in the baseline game
is to extract 10 (the maximum possible) tokens from the Group Fund, while the social op-
timum is to extract nothing. Since the Group Fund is shared equally among group mem-
bers, extraction by one individual creates a negative externality on others, setting up the
social dilemma.5 Each subject makes extraction decisions over 20 rounds, with random
rematching into groups of 4 at the start of each round.6 In each decision round, subjects
simultaneously decide how much to extract from the Group Fund.
4A is the income level with sanctions while B is the income level without sanctions.
5This design is often used to study extraction from a CPR. It is the mirror image of the voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM) game used to examine private provision of a public good. See Andreoni
(1995), Cox et al. (2013), Khadjavi and Lange (2015) for comparisons of behavior in payoff-equivalent
extraction and contribution games in the laboratory.
6Random rematching is chosen to mitigate reputation formation across rounds, and allow for stronger
tests of hypotheses. Using different matching protocols can affect decisions in predictable ways (Botelho
et al., 2009).
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2.4.1 Monitoring and Sanctions/Rewards
Exogenous monitoring, sanctions and rewards are implemented using a design simi-
lar to that followed in tax compliance experiments. In each treatment round, subjects are
informed, ex-ante, the exact probability of their group's decision being monitored. This
probability, p, is varied between 12% and 25%. Each group is randomly assigned num-
ber(s), X ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 8}. For example, if the chance of being monitored in the round
is 12%(25%), one(two) of the eight possible numbers are assigned to the group. The exper-
imenter then rolls an eight-sided die. If the die roll matches any of the number(s) assigned
to a group, the group members' harvest decisions are reviewed.7
If a group is reviewed, individuals in the group may pay a fine from, or receive a re-
ward into, their private fund based on their harvest decision. The severity of sanctions/rewards,
α, is varied between 1 and 2 and is known to the subjects in each round before they make
their decision. For example if a group's decision is reviewed and the severity is 1(2), and
a subject has harvested 2 tokens, he/she is sanctioned 2(4) experimental currency units
(ECU) from his/her Individual Fund.
Four probability-severity (p× α) combinations are used for within-subject comparisons:
(i) Baseline without sanctions (0 × 0), (ii) Low-Probability#High-Severity (0.125 × 2),
(iii) High-Probability#Low-Severity (0.25 × 1), and (iv) High-Probability#High-Severity
(0.25 × 2). Combinations (ii) and (iii) keep the expected penalty or reward constant, con-
ditional on harvest level. Five rounds of each of the four combinations are implemented,
while randomizing the order between rounds, ensuring that differences in harvest levels be-
tween them are not due to learning the game over rounds.
7This allows for variation in review outcomes across groups within each round while rolling the die
once for all subjects in the round.
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2.4.2 Quota Regimes
Between-subject comparisons are used to test the effects of four governance regimes
which leverage varying social norms regarding harvest from the common property resource.
In the first regime, the quota is fixed at the social optimum, i.e. zero harvest. The second
regime sanctions individuals who harvest more than their current group's average harvest
in the previous round.8 The third regime implements a fee-bate scheme where individuals
who harvest more than their group's average harvest level in the previous period are sanc-
tioned and those who harvest less are rewarded. Finally, the fourth regime implements an
endogenous harvest norm by using a fee-bate scheme where individuals who harvest more
than their group's current period average are sanctioned while those who harvest less are
rewarded. This mechanism is akin to the efficient mechanism for public good contributions
proposed and tested in Falkinger et al. (2000).
At the end of each round, subjects receive feedback on whether they were reviewed,
the amount of fines/rewards, the amount remaining in their Individual Fund and in the
shared Group Fund, and their net individual earnings for the round. Their earnings across
20 rounds are accumulated and converted to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 1 ECU
= $0.05 to determine their earnings. The experiment design, treatments and sample size
considerations are described in Figure 1.
2.4.3 Risk Task
After the extraction game, subjects participate in an individual risk task. The ex-
pected earning from the risk task was calibrated to be the same as the expected earning
from one round of the extraction game, to maintain comparability of stakes when account-
ing for the effect of risk attitudes on harvest decisions. Each subject chooses one out of six
8Calibrating the quota to the average group level harvest in the previous round, coupled with random
rematching of subjects across rounds, makes the harvest quota exogenous to individual decisions in the
current period. It mitigates the potential for subjects to attempt to game the system, i.e. increase the
quota in a future period by increasing harvest levels in the current period.
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lotteries with equi-probable outcomes. This particular risk task allows for differentiation of
subjects by their degree of individual relative risk aversion, and identification of individu-
als as risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking.9 After all subjects have made their choice,
the experimenter tosses a coin to determine which of the two equi-probable earnings ac-
crue to the subject for their chosen lottery option.
2.4.4 Experimental Procedure
Experiments are operationalized using z-Tree version 3.6.7 (Fischbacher, 2007). The
sessions were conducted in Georgia State University's Experimental Economics Center lab-
oratory over February to June, 2018. A total of 256 subjects participated in 13 experimen-
tal sessions.
When subjects reached the lab, they read and signed informed consent forms and were
randomly assigned to computer terminals indexed by cards drawn from a cup. After all
participating subjects were seated, they received printed instructions (included in Ap-
pendix A). The experimenter then reviewed the instructions publicly. To better under-
stand the experimental task, subjects were also given an interactive Earnings Simulator
where they could enter different combinations of their own and others' decisions and see
the corresponding earnings in each scenario with and without sanctions. Subjects spent
approximately 1.5 minutes on this simulator. Then, paid rounds of the experiment were
started. No prior information was provided regarding the total number of rounds or num-
ber of rounds in each treatment condition. No communication between subjects was al-
lowed during the experiment. The average earnings was $23.78 over all rounds of the ex-
traction game, and $2.09 from the risk task.
After the extraction game and risk task were completed, subjects filled out a debriefing
questionnaire, entered their demographic information (summarized in Table 21), and an-
9The choices used are adapted from the modified Eckel-Grossman task discussed in Charness et al.
(2013).
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swered un-incentivized questions regarding their preferences.10 Subject instructions for all
experimental tasks are included in the Appendix A.
Figure 1: Experiment Design
2.5 Results
The cumulative distribution of harvest levels under the deterrence parameter combina-
tions and under the different quota regimes are shown in Figure 2.
10The specific questions are adapted from an experimentally validated survey instrument developed in
Falk et al. (2016)
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Figure 2: Cumulative Distributions of Harvest Levels
The cumulative distribution of harvest confirm that sanctions and rewards are effec-
tive in reducing harvest by individuals. Speaking to the primary research question posed
in this paper, the figure shows that under High-Probability#Low-Severity (green line), the
c.d.f. of harvest first order stochastically dominates the c.d.f under Low-Probability#High-
Severity (red line) in the fixed quota regime, the variable quota with fee-bate regime, as
well as in the endogenous quota with fee-bate regime. This provides an indication that
harvest levels are lower on average when monitoring is more likely but severity of sanc-
tions is lower than in the equivalent condition where monitoring is less likely but severity
of sanctions is higher.
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2.5.1 Deterrent Effects on Harvest under Alternate Quota Regimes
The effect of deterrence parameters under alternate quota and feebate regimes are first
estimated using a random effects GLS model. The results are shown in Table 1. Separate
estimations are performed for each of the quota regimes since they are qualitatively differ-
ent in terms of the incentives involved. The estimation model under each regime is:
Yijt = α +
3∑
k=1
βkT
k
ijt + γXij + ωj + ijt (7)
where Yijt is individual i's harvest level in session j in period t, T
k
ijt are the treatment
variables where k = 1 represents Low-P#High-S, k = 2 represents High-P#Low-S and
k = 3 represents High-P#High-S respectively, Xij represent characteristics specific to in-
dividual i in session j such as their risk attitude, whether he/she was reviewed in the pre-
vious period, amount of fines/rewards in the previous period, their accumulated earnings,
the exogenous quota for the round (where applicable), and standard demographic controls
including gender, age and race. ωj are indicators for session j.
Since harvest decisions are experimentally bounded between 0 and 10, two-limit RE
Tobit regressions are also estimated.11 In the two-limit Tobit model, instead of the ob-
served Yijt in (7), the predicted outcome is an unobserved latent variable, y
∗
ijt, where
Yijt = 0 if y
∗
ijt ≤ 0
= y∗ijt if y
∗
ijt > 0 and y
∗
ijt < 10
= 10 if y∗ijt ≥ 0 (8)
Marginal effects on the observed variable (E[Y |X]) are reported in Table 2.
11The Tobit model imposes more restrictive assumptions in that the error term should be normally dis-
tributed and homoskedastic. A plot of residuals versus fitted values suggests that this assumption may not
hold in the data.
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Table 1: RE GLS: Effects on Harvest Under Alternate Quota Regimes
Fixed Quota Variable Quota Variable Quota Endogenous Quota
Fines Only Fines Only Feebate Feebate
Average Harvest in Baseline 6.560 6.227 6.673 5.986
Deterrence Factors
Low-P#High-S (1) -0.681∗ -0.489 -1.008∗∗ -0.877∗
(0.3174) (0.3105) (0.3365) (0.3968)
High-P#Low-S (2) -1.630∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗ -1.774∗∗∗ -1.999∗∗∗
(0.2870) (0.2786) (0.3630) (0.4188)
(2) - (1)a -0.949∗∗∗ -0.298+ -0.766∗∗ -1.122∗∗∗
(0.2563) (0.1601) (0.2623) (0.2594)
High-P#High-S -2.102∗∗∗ -1.095∗ -2.427∗∗∗ -2.490∗∗∗
(0.3485) (0.4615) (0.5268) (0.6216)
Risk Seeking 0.178 0.154 0.253∗ 0.364∗
(0.1457) (0.1810) (0.1007) (0.1521)
Reviewedt−1 -1.304∗∗∗ -0.180 0.0784 -0.237
(0.2494) (0.1539) (0.2374) (0.3053)
Finet−1 0.162∗∗∗ 0.104+ 0.172∗∗ 0.0902
(0.0283) (0.0631) (0.0593) (0.0862)
Rewardt−1 -0.0481 -0.0718
(0.0559) (0.0931)
Harvest Quota 0.321∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
(0.0556) (0.0468)
Period -0.453∗ -0.293 -1.023∗∗∗ -0.608∗
(0.1903) (0.2430) (0.2429) (0.2650)
Accumulated Earningst−1 0.0193
∗ 0.0144 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0108)
Gender, Age & Race Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session IDs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1520 1140 1140 1064
Subjects 80 60 60 56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a: The differences are estimated using Wald tests of equality of coefficients between Low-P#High-S
and High-P#Low-S.
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Table 2: RE Tobit: Effects on Harvest Under Alternate Quota Regimes
Fixed Quota Variable Quota Variable Quota Endogenous Quota
Fines Only Fines Only Feebate Feebate
Average Harvest in Baseline 6.560 6.227 6.673 5.986
Deterrence Factors
Low-P#HighS (1) -0.800∗∗ -0.570+ -1.289∗∗∗ -1.044∗
(0.2860) (0.3002) (0.3197) (0.4105)
High-P#Low-S (2) -2.325∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -2.202∗∗∗ -2.560∗∗∗
(0.2824) (0.2768) (0.2962) (0.3670)
(2) - (1)a -1.525∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗ -0.913∗∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗
(0.2687) (0.1905) (0.2070) (0.2591)
High-P#High-S -2.795∗∗∗ -1.358∗∗ -3.001∗∗∗ -3.181∗∗∗
(0.2993) (0.4760) (0.5074) (0.6447)
Risk Seeking 0.403+ 0.223 0.417∗∗ 0.518∗
(0.2261) (0.2566) (0.1414) (0.2018)
Reviewedt−1 -1.465∗∗∗ -0.154 0.131 -0.205
(0.4203) (0.2117) (0.2910) (0.3541)
Finet−1 0.180∗∗∗ 0.100 0.151∗ 0.0592
(0.0398) (0.0714) (0.0717) (0.0977)
Rewardt−1 -0.0315 -0.0885
(0.0664) (0.1180)
Harvest Quota 0.372∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.0483) (0.0460)
Period -0.277 0.378 -0.417+ -0.0662
(0.2255) (0.2548) (0.2470) (0.3162)
Accumulated Earningst−1 0.0110 -0.0137 0.0204
∗ 0.00675
(0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0128)
Gender, Age & Race Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session IDs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1520 1140 1140 1064
Subjects 80 60 60 56
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
a: The differences are estimated using Wald tests of equality of coefficients between Low-P#High-S
and High-P#Low-S.
Wald tests of difference in coefficients on Low-P#High-S and High-P#Low-S indicate
that harvest levels are always statistically significantly lower under the latter condition, i.e.
when the probability of detection is higher than when the severity of sanctions/rewards is
higher. Comparing Tables 1 and 2, and assuming that the Tobit model assumptions hold,
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the OLS model underestimates the effect of sanctions on harvest decisions. See Table 20
for a comparison of results between all subjects and subjects identified to be risk-averse in
the Eckel-Grossman task.
The results confirm that a higher probability of monitoring with less severe fines/rewards
(High-P#Low-S) is approximately twice as effective in reducing harvest from the CPR
than an equivalently lower probability of monitoring with more severe fines/rewards (Low-
P#High-S). High probability and high severity sanctions/rewards perform better than the
two equivalent intermediate combinations, showing that both parameters work progres-
sively, as expected.
Result 1: A higher probability of being monitored is approximately twice as effective as
an equivalent increase in the severity of fines and rewards.
Other results shown in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that lower degrees of individual risk
aversion lead to higher harvest levels in all four quota regimes. Being reviewed in the pre-
vious period leads to lower harvest in the current period only in the fixed quota with fines
regime. In the feebate treatments, the lack of a statistically significant relationship be-
tween being reviewed in the previous period and current period harvest is unsurprising
since being reviewed does not necessarily lead to a loss of earnings. An increase in exoge-
nous harvest quotas lead to a less than proportional increase in harvest levels.
2.5.2 Elasticity of Harvest
An alternative way to describe the effect of sanctions is to consider the responsiveness
of harvest with respect to probability of monitoring and severity of sanctions/rewards, ce-
teris paribus. Estimating elasticities of harvest after regressing harvest levels on the val-
ues of probability and severity along with the other controls, Table 3 shows that a 1% in-
crease in probability of monitoring leads to a reduction in harvest between 5.86% (under
the variable quota with fines regime) and 19.8% (under the endogenous quota with feebate
regime). However, a 1% change in the severity of fines and rewards does not lead to any
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significant change in harvest decisions.
Table 3: Elasticities of Harvest
Fixed Quota Variable Quota Variable Quota Endogenous Quota
Fines Only Fines Only Feebate Feebate
Probability -0.184∗∗∗ -0.0586∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0182) (0.0318) (0.0349)
Severity 0.001 -0.00578 -0.00166 0.0317
(0.0316) (0.0228) (0.0297) (0.0328)
Observations 1520 1140 1140 1064
Subjects 80 60 60 56
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Elasticities are estimated after RE GLS regressions with specific Probability and Severity values (p
and α) as explanatory variables along with all controls used in Table 1.
Result 2: A 1% increase in the probability of being monitored, ceteris paribus, leads to
a reduction in harvest across all quota and feebate regimes. The effect varies between a low
of 5.86% in the variable quota with fines regime and a high of 19.9% in the endogenous
quota with feebate regime.
2.5.3 Heterogeneities in Treatment Effects by Agent Type
Starting from Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Falk and Fischbacher (2002), a number of
studies have shown that individuals in social dilemmas often follow identifiable patterns of
strategic behavior. On the basis of these patterns, individuals can be classified into strate-
gic types depending on their responses to decisions of others.12
The method of classification that best suits this experiment is described in Kurzban
and Houser (2005) where types are defined ex-ante as conditional cooperators, altruists (or
unconditional cooperators) and free-riders. Following their methodology, agent types are
categorized as follows:
12See Chaudhuri (2011) for an extensive review of studies on defining and explaining conditionally
cooperative behavior.
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• Conditional cooperators are those who harvest more in the Baseline condition when
others harvest more. In the fixed quota with fines and the endogenous quota regimes,
this implies a positive correlation between an agent's harvest in the current period
and the average harvest by others in the previous period. In the variable (but exoge-
nous) quota regimes, this implies a positive correlation between an agent's harvest
in the current period and the exogenous harvest quota revealed to the agent in the
current period.
• Free riders are those who harvest 50% or more of the maximum possible harvest in
all but the first round of the Baseline condition and there exists no positive correla-
tion between harvest in the current period and the previous period's harvest.
• Altruists are those who harvest less than 50% of the maximum possible harvest in all
but the first round of the Baseline condition and there exists no positive correlation
between harvest in the current period and the previous period's harvest.
Those who do not fall in any of the three above categories are classified as Uncatego-
rized. Table 4 shows the distribution of agents by type in the sample.
Table 4: Distribution of Agent Types
Agent Free Conditional
Type Riders Altruists Cooperators Uncategorized Total
Number 71 17 124 44 256
Proportion 27.73% 6.64% 48.44% 17.19%
To quantify the effect of sanctions on these different types, a difference-in-differences
estimation (Equation 9) is used and the coefficients are reported in Table 22. The corre-
sponding marginal effects on different strategic types are shown in Table 5.
Yijt = α+
3∑
k=1
β1kT
k
ijt+
3∑
s=1
β2sStratType
s
ij+
3∑
k=1
3∑
s=1
δksT
k
ijt#StratType
s
ij+γXij+ωj+ijt (9)
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where Xij includes all factors specific to individual i in session j mentioned in (7) as
well as the average withdrawal by individual i in the baseline. This ensures that the esti-
mation accounts for the different levels of harvest by different strategic types.
Table 5: Marginal Effects by Agent Type
Fixed Quota Fines Only Variable Quota Fines Only
Free Rider Altruist Conditional Free Rider Altruist Conditional
Cooperator Cooperator
Low-P#High-S -2.412∗∗∗ 3.865∗∗∗ -0.268 -1.145∗∗ -0.152 -0.426
(0.6156) (1.0452) (0.3134) (0.5805) (0.4829) (0.3445)
High-P#Low-S -2.752∗∗∗ 1.350∗∗ -1.303∗∗∗ -1.817∗∗∗ 0.174 -0.550∗
(0.5164) (0.5280) (0.3975) (0.4851) (0.4871) (0.3081)
High-P#High-S -4.069∗∗∗ 2.614∗∗∗ -1.636∗∗∗ -1.987∗∗∗ 0.0266 -1.178∗∗
(0.6531) (0.7350) (0.4048) (0.6866) (0.8732) (0.4628)
Variable Quota Feebate Endogenous Quota Feebate
Free Rider Altruist Conditional Free Rider Altruist Conditional
Cooperator Cooperator
Low-P#High-S -1.400∗∗∗ -0.562 -0.932∗∗ -2.606∗∗∗ 0.224 -0.502
(0.4371) (0.3490) (0.3728) (0.5424) (0.5692) (0.5416)
High-P#Low-S -3.032∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗ -1.363∗∗∗ -4.264∗∗∗ 0.000675 -2.050∗∗∗
(0.7071) (0.3441) (0.3568) (0.6307) (0.3943) (0.4978)
High-P#High-S -4.087∗∗∗ 0.165 -1.905∗∗∗ -4.427∗∗∗ -0.564 -2.258∗∗
(0.7426) (0.5974) (0.5238) (0.7191) (0.6362) (0.9122)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Sanctions are most effective in reducing harvest by free riders. They are less effective
on conditional cooperators. Under the fixed quota with fines regime, sanctions backfire on
altruists, raising the lower than average levels of harvest by this strategic type. This could
be due to crowding out of their intrinsic motivation to harvest less from the common
pool.
Result 3: Sanctions and rewards are most effective in reducing harvest by free riders.
Their effects are lower on conditional cooperators. Altruists sometimes respond to monitor-
ing by increasing their harvest levels.
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2.5.4 Decisions on the Intensive and Extensive Margins
The distribution of harvest levels shows a considerable spike at the maximum possi-
ble (Figure 3). Therefore, it is pertinent to conduct separate estimations of the decision
of whether to harvest the maximum possible and the decision regarding how much to har-
vest, given that harvest is less than the maximum possible. The former is estimated using
a random effects probit model, while the latter is estimated using a random effects GLS
model conditional on harvest level being less than the maximum possible.
Figure 3: Distributions of Harvest Levels
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Table 6: Harvest Decisions on the Intensive and Extensive Margins
Fixed Quota Variable Quota Variable Quota Endogenous Quota
Fines Only Fines Only Feebate Feebate
Probit GLS Probit GLS Probit GLS Probit GLS
Low-P#High-S -0.0888∗ -0.233 -0.0505 -0.411+ -0.117∗ -0.889∗∗ -0.0997 -0.513
(0.0429) (0.2237) (0.0544) (0.2282) (0.0590) (0.3010) (0.0643) (0.3269)
High-P#Low-S -0.212∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.360+ -0.207∗∗∗ -1.189∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -1.070∗∗
(0.0368) (0.2457) (0.0504) (0.2187) (0.0590) (0.2693) (0.0642) (0.3292)
High-P#-High-S -0.208∗∗∗ -1.200∗∗∗ -0.0837 -0.982∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -1.611∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -1.398∗∗
(0.0420) (0.2805) (0.0823) (0.3323) (0.0702) (0.4365) (0.0747) (0.4907)
Risk Seeking 0.0492∗∗ -0.268+ 0.00791 0.118 0.0304∗ 0.111 0.0373∗ 0.232+
(0.0163) (0.1596) (0.0155) (0.1599) (0.0147) (0.0996) (0.0185) (0.1196)
Reviewedt−1 -0.0801∗ -0.694∗∗ -0.0185 -0.158 0.0200 -0.115 0.0192 -0.210
(0.0339) (0.2258) (0.0343) (0.1409) (0.0247) (0.2131) (0.0591) (0.2185)
Finet−1 0.00984∗∗ 0.0924∗∗ 0.00907 0.104 0.00911∗∗ 0.0583 0.00386 0.000629
(0.0032) (0.0286) (0.0097) (0.0688) (0.0033) (0.0722) (0.0114) (0.0489)
Rewardt−1 0.000966 -0.0248 -0.0579 -0.0140
(0.0071) (0.0403) (0.0417) (0.0770)
Male 0.0986 0.765 0.00831 0.552 0.156∗∗ -1.299∗∗ 0.0979 -0.645
(0.0628) (0.4901) (0.0502) (0.6008) (0.0592) (0.4447) (0.0692) (0.4420)
Exogenous Quota 0.0104 0.347∗∗∗ 0.0130∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0631) (0.0054) (0.0440)
Period -0.00617 -0.330 -0.0281 -0.257 -0.0417 -0.314 -0.0581 0.0305
(0.0235) (0.2091) (0.0355) (0.2036) (0.0294) (0.2177) (0.0408) (0.2663)
Accumulated Earningst−1 0.000163 0.0146 0.00113 0.0136 0.00198+ 0.0148+ 0.00267 0.000971
(0.0010) (0.0089) (0.0015) (0.0086) (0.0012) (0.0086) (0.0016) (0.0110)
Observations 1501 1157 1102 952 1140 968 988 855
Subjects 80 60 60 56
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Results in Table 6 suggest that the differences in harvest level between Low-P#High-
S and High-P#Low-S operate on both the intensive and extensive margins of harvest.
The exogenous harvest quota has effects on the intensive margin, showing that a 1 unit
increase in the harvest quota leads to between 0.35 to 0.43 unit reduction in harvest, con-
ditional on harvest being less than the maximum possible. Being reviewed in the previous
period leads to a 8% reduction in the likelihood that an individual harvests the maximum
possible from the CPR. On the intensive margin, being reviewed in the previous period
leads to a 0.7 unit reduction in harvest.
Result 4: Sanctions and rewards are effective on both the intensive and the extensive
margin.
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2.6 Conclusions
What are the incentives that affect decisions regarding how much to harvest from com-
mon property resources? This paper finds that in the context of exogenous monitoring and
sanctioning mechanisms and over relatively small probability and severity values, the prob-
ability of being monitored is a more effective deterrent against socially sub-optimal extrac-
tion than an equivalent increase in the severity of fines. This result holds across multiple
quota and fee-bate regimes that leverage variable norms of CPR utilization. Examining
the effects of monitoring and sanctions on different strategic types shows that reduction in
harvest are driven by free riders reducing their otherwise high levels of harvest. Altruists,
on the other hand, tend to react perversely to externally enforced sanctions, in tune with
the idea of crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
Looking back at existing work on this issue using experiments, this paper's findings
contrast with the broad conclusions in Anderson and Stafford (2003) and Friesen (2012).13
On the other hand, this paper's results are consonant with a number of studies on tax
compliance and traffic violations. As mentioned earlier, Alm (2012) reports a number of
studies that find the probability of audits to be a more effective deterrent against under-
reporting of income than equivalent increases in severity of fines. A number of studies on
driving behavior suggest that even large increases in fixed penalties lead to relatively mi-
nor reductions in traffic violations (Elvik, 2016, Moolenaar, 2014). What matters more in
terms of reducing such violations is whether the laws are enforced as primary or as sec-
ondary offences (Cohen and Einav, 2003), or the effectiveness of information campaigns
13Anderson and Stafford's RE Tobit coefficient estimates suggest that contributions to a public good
are about a third higher due to a unit increase in severity of sanctions, compared to an equivalent change
in probability of sanctions. The authors do not, however, substantiate their results with controls for indi-
vidual risk attitudes or use Wald tests of differences in coefficients after their regressions. Using individual
decisions regarding whether to comply with a costly regulation, Friesen's overall result suggests that sever-
ity is a more effective driver of compliance than probability of fines. However, compliance rates are not
statistically significantly different over combinations of probability and severity of sanctions similar to
those considered in this paper. For instance, the compliance rate under sanctions with probability of 0.1
and severity of 20 is 21%, while that under sanctions with probability of 0.2 and severity of 10 is 19%.
The one-sided test for the former being greater than the latter fails to reject the null of equality, with a
p-value of 0.43.
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about a new traffic safety legislation (Abouk and Adams, 2013).
Some limitations of this study should be mentioned here. Although the risk task used
here is relatively easy to understand and provides estimates of individual risk attitudes,
it cannot be used to predict probability weights which could be important in the deci-
sion making process of individuals. Moreover, the abstract decision context and subject
pool, while theoretically sound, do not allow for specific claims regarding how these results
might change across decision domains.
A couple of interesting aspects of regulation that have not been addressed in this paper
may inform design of future experiments testing relative effects of probability and severity.
For instance, the regulator's role can be made more flexible by allowing for re-adjustment
of probabilities and severities depending on the outcome of reviews in the current period.
Further, a careful categorization of behavioral types can also inform exogenous or even
endogenous sorting of different individuals into groups with varying deterrence parameters
under the alternative quota regimes considered here.
In summary, this paper finds that a higher probability of monitoring is more effective
at deterring harvest from a common pool resource than an equivalent increase in the sever-
ity of fines. This result holds across a number of quota and fee-bate regimes that reflect
changing norms governing resource utilization. Moreover, sanctions and rewards have het-
erogeneous effects on different types of strategic agents  reducing the high levels of har-
vest by free riders while sometimes crowding out the intrinsic motivation of altruists. This
suggests that policymakers should stress the probability of detecting violations more than
severity of fines. Moreover, norms and strategic behavior in resource extraction should be
examined carefully before implementing monitoring and sanctioning regimes.
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3 CBNRM and Elephant Populations in Africa14
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines whether community-based natural resource management (CB-
NRM) has had an impact on the population of the biggest terrestrial animals: African ele-
phants. Pioneered by the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Re-
sources (CAMPFIRE) program in Zimbabwe, CBNRM is an approach that seeks to allow
individuals to directly manage and benefit from natural resources. The CBNRM approach,
as it relates to wildlife, involves distribution of revenues from wildlife services such as eco-
tourism or trophy hunting to local people. The perfect community oriented program would
involve full assignment of property rights, including rights of extraction and revenue distri-
bution, over wildlife to communities. This would align the incentives for locals to manage
their wildlife resources as a common pool instead of an open access resource.
In post-colonial Africa, national governments have historically owned the rights to nat-
ural resources in most countries, with the exception of South Africa where there are a siz-
able share of privately owned game reserves (Child, 2003). Hence, while communities have
had to bear the cost of wildlife conservation manifested as human-animal conflicts and dis-
placement, the benefits of conservation  such as tourism revenues  have largely been cap-
tured by the national governments.15 This has driven a wedge between conservation efforts
and incentives for local people to engage with such programs. Correcting this misalign-
ment of benefits and costs provides the economic rationale for the shift towards CBNRM
programs. In sub-Saharan Africa, CBNRM has evolved as a tool to derive dual benefits of
conservation and poverty alleviation by generating a direct revenue stream from wildlife to
14I would like to thank Spencer Banzhaf for his comments and suggestions at every stage of this
project. I also received valuable feedback from Terry Anderson, Timothy Fitzgerald, Wally Thurman,
Daniel Benjamin, Randy Rucker, Dean Lueck, Christopher Timmins, Bart Wilson, and Reed Watson at
the Property and Environment Research Center in Bozeman, MT, conference participants at Camp Re-
sources 2017 and the World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2018.
15Crop damage is more likely to occur along the boundaries of protected areas and usually decreases
with increasing distance from the boundary. Elephants from the protected area raid crops closest to the
boundary because the risk of detection is lowest there (Parker et al., 2007).
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the communities living in close contact with them.
A large number of qualitative articles suggest that the actual experience of CBNRM
in Africa has not been very positive. For instance, Turner (2004) points out that unless
CBNRM programs are backed by very strong local governance systems, they are not likely
to succeed. Oppressive governments and extractive practices have negative effects on CB-
NRM programs as well as wildlife resources in a country. This is probably most apparent
in Zimbabwe, where the CAMPFIRE initiative has been significantly impeded since the
mid-2000s due to worsening governance (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2010). Thus, although
CBNRM policies might work in theory, their actual effect on wildlife populations is still an
open question.
Very few rigorous evaluations of CBNRM programs have been performed, with most
analyses restricted to case studies of specific projects. While case studies are useful tools
in specific contexts, the external validity of their results is limited by a number of factors
that cannot be accounted for without employing a more systematic empirical approach.
Given the volume of revenue generated by wildlife services (Di Minin et al., 2016, Lindsey
et al., 2007), the outcome on wildlife in general  and elephants in particular  becomes
important in order to understand the impact of CBNRM projects. This paper is an empir-
ical evaluation of how community-based programs have affected wild elephant populations
in Africa and, further, how this effect is influenced by variation in country-specific charac-
teristics.
3.2 Background
The largest living terrestrial animals, African elephants (Loxodonta africana) consti-
tute an important part of the savannah ecosystems of Africa. Over the last three decades,
elephant populations have declined dramatically (Figure 4). The species is now classified
as Vulnerable in IUCN's Red List of Threatened Species  in the same category as polar
bears.
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Figure 4: African Elephant Population (1979 - 2013)
International environmental groups, multilateral agencies and national governments
have emphasized the need to combat the deterioration in elephant populations. The Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) imposed a ban on interna-
tional ivory trade in 1989.16 The effectiveness of this ban in improving elephant popula-
tions is, however, questionable (Hitch, 2014). In the late 1990s, some countries in southern
Africa argued successfully to be allowed to export a pre-specified quota of ivory from their
stockpiles.17
In 2014, an upsurge in illegal poaching of African elephants was recorded, coinciding
with increases in illegal ivory seizures and black market ivory prices. Wittemyer et al.
(2014) argues that current levels of poaching exceed the intrinsic growth capacity of the
species, which they estimate at 4 percent per year. Data on the Proportion of Illegally
Killed Elephants (PIKE) collected by IUCN shows that the number of elephants killed
16The African elephant was listed in Appendix-I of CITES' endangered species list for all countries
in Africa. Appendix-I lists species threatened with extinction. Commercial trade in these specimens is
strictly prohibited, while other trade  largely in the form of hunting trophies or for scientific and educa-
tional purposes  is tightly controlled (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009).
17African elephants were taken from Appendix-I to Appendix-II in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe
in 1997, and in South Africa in 2000. Appendix-II lists species not necessarily threatened with extinction,
but in which trade must be controlled in order to ensure their survival.
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by poachers (as a proportion of the total number of elephant carcasses found) has been
increasing over the last decade (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Trend in Proportion of Illegally Killed Elephants (PIKE)
3.2.1 CBNRM
The CBNRM approach to conservation has gained popularity over the last four decades,
with more than 50 countries transferring some degree of forest management and decision-
making authority to local user groups as of 2002 (Armitage, 2005). In sub-Saharan Africa,
modern CBNRM programs were pioneered by the well publicized CAMPFIRE program
in Zimbabwe initiated in the 1980s. The motivation behind setting up the program was
that if wildlife provided only public benefits, no matter how many schools and clinics were
built this would never achieve conservation (Child, 2004). Brian Child argues that only if
wildlife provides direct, tangible benefits to local communities would they have the incen-
tive to devote resources to conservation.
Multiple reports and case studies on CBNRM projects across the continent suggest
that the theoretical ideal of full devolution of property rights over wildlife to communities
is seldom actually implemented (Fabricius et al., 2004, Rihoy et al., 2007, Turner, 2004).
Instead, CBNRM projects are often a way to institutionalize benefit sharing between the
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state or regional governments and local people. Thus, instead of all revenues (such as tro-
phy hunting fees, entry fees etc.) being collected by the government, a CBNRM project
will typically involve a percentage of the revenue accruing to the communities located in
or around the park area. The actual percentage can vary over time and across parks, al-
though at present there is no reliable comprehensive analysis of variation along this dimen-
sion.
In terms of project implementation, neighboring communities and settlements meet
and choose to appoint members to an administrative body  such as a Community Based
Organization (CBO) in Botswana or a Regional District Council (RDC) in Zimbabawe
 that acts as the representative of the communities to the government. Formation of
these organizations could arguably lower transaction costs of negotiating rights or benefit-
sharing with national governments since they are a single body representing a group whose
members would otherwise have to negotiate individually with the state.
How well these community organizations actually work depends on institutional fac-
tors like governance, rent seeking and differential bargaining power(s) of individuals. The
following sections describe three cases of existing CBNRM projects in Zimbabwe, Zambia
and Namibia. Although there are other CBNRM projects in sub-Saharan Africa (like those
in Tanzania and Botswana) the three projects described here give an overview of how CB-
NRM strategies are structured and implemented.
3.2.2 The CAMPFIRE Program in Zimbabwe
The CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe was developed to manage wildlife and wildlife
habitat in communal lands so that people living in these areas could benefit. Before CAMP-
FIRE, wildlife was exclusively owned by the State, and licences for commercial use were
not typically granted. Consequently, individuals and communities, who were largely en-
gaged in agriculture, treated wild animals as pests. CAMPFIRE aimed to align land use
with the natural opportunities and constraints of these agriculturally marginal areas. Wildlife
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use predominated as it produced the most value, principally through safari hunting and
ecotourism (Frost and Bond, 2008). The development of CAMPFIRE was influenced by an
earlier project called Wildlife Industries for All (WINDFALL), that also involved distribut-
ing meat from culled elephants and some revenue from trophy fees to rural communities
adjacent to state-managed protected areas, with the aim of encouraging a positive atti-
tude to wildlife. This project was not successful, but provided lessons for the CAMPFIRE
paradigm.
Some agreements made under the CAMPFIRE program have included explicit require-
ments for communities in the concession area not to harass or hunt wildlife, to limit ex-
pansion of crops and livestock, to confine human settlement to agreed zones and, in a few
cases, to even move away from prime wildlife areas (Frost and Bond, 2008).
The process of allocating hunting concessions and distribution of benefits is recorded
through Brian Child's work. First, a list was prepared of animals shot by hunters in each
village area and how much the animals were worth. Next, individuals in the community
responsible for the hunting area were told how much each member was entitled to. Then,
the community collectively discussed how to use the money in terms of setting up pub-
lic infrastructure or distributing cash to its individual members. At an official ceremony,
$60,000 was carried into a public meeting of the whole village and placed in prominent
view. Each member came forward and received his or her full share in cash. Then, as they
had agreed previously, the members put money into buckets signifying the projects they
had chosen and pocketed the remaining cash. Within three years, 73 percent of revenues
were reaching the community level (Child and Barnes, 2010). Given its history and scope,
CAMPFIRE has long been considered the flagship CBNRM program in Africa.
3.2.3 The ADMADE Program in Zambia
Zambia's hallmark CBNRM program was Administrative Management Design for Game
Management Areas (ADMADE). The program began in 1989, but one of the key precur-
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sors was the Lupande Development Project that operated from 1984 to 1987 and focused
on wildlife management, and especially elephant management.
Sharing of revenue from wildlife hunting with local communities constituted one of the
key elements of ADMADE. The experiences gained during ADMADE led to the enactment
of the 1998 Zambia Wildlife Act No.12 that makes specific provisions for the participation
of local communities in wildlife management through local institutional structures known
as Community Resources Boards (CRBs) (Roe et al., 2009). One of the first CBNRM pro-
grams was initiated in South Luangwa National Park with benefit sharing starting in 1995.
There is currently an arrangement in place where hunting and eco-tourism revenues
are equally shared between Zambia's Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and local communities.
At the Lupande Game Mangement Area (GMA), a consensus was reached to allocate all
revenues from Lupande GMA to communities and to allow them to decide for themselves
how to use this money - provided they were organised and followed a set of guidelines that
ensured transparent, accountable, democratic management at a scale where people could
meet face-to-face. This consensus was taken to the project's review and policy meetings in
April 1996, where the new approach was formally adopted.
3.2.4 The LIFE Project in Namibia
The Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project has been implemented through a
cooperative agreement with the World Wildlife Fund and several local partners. Namibian
organizations receive international assistance to work with local communities and support
policy and legislative change. A community has to form a legal, registered conservancy
in order to get the right to hunt certain species of wildlife for their own use, the right to
enter into contracts with the private sector for trophy hunting and photographic tourism
activities, and to obtain permits from the government for the sale of live game to ranchers.
The community must define its membership, define its borders, have a representative com-
mittee, develop an equitable benefit distribution plan, and have a legal constitution. The
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project partners assist communities in going through these various steps with particular
emphasis on ensuring that as many community members as possible are directly involved
in the process.
Once conservancies have been established, support is provided for the institutional de-
velopment of conservancies, including committee administration, financial management,
staff management, and accountability and transparency in decision-making. Conservancies
also receive considerable capacity building in establishing joint venture partnerships with
the private sector for photographic tourism and trophy hunting. The project supports the
conservancy in developing its requirements for partners, and then in putting out tenders
and negotiating contracts. In 2008, there were 44 registered communal area conservancies
in Namibia covering more than 10.5 million hectares of land, while an additional 30 con-
servancies were at various stages of development (Davis, 2008).
3.2.5 Empirical Evidence
Very few empirical studies have been performed on evaluating the impact of CBNRM
policies on elephant populations. One of these studies, McPherson and Nieswiadomy (2000),
argues that countries with property-rights-based policies have more rapid growth rates in
elephant populations. Their paper uses annual data on elephant populations for 37 coun-
tries in Africa over 1969-1994.18 The authors argue that countries with a national-level
natural resource management program that assigned some property rights to local com-
munities have higher growth rates of elephant populations.19 The paper also claims that
political instability and absence of representative governments are associated with signifi-
18Annual data on country level elephant populations is collected from different sources for the years
1969, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1989, 1994. Data for most countries (except Uganda and Kenya) is
used only for the years 1979, 1981, 1989 and 1994.
19Property rights are modeled using two dummy variables. The first one indicates whether a country
had a national-level natural resource management program which assigned some property rights to local
communities and the other identifies countries that do not have national programs, but have localized CB-
NRM programs. Regression results are reported only for the model which uses the first dummy variable
and not the second one.
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cantly lower elephant population growth.20 The estimation does not, however, account for
un-observable factors that may bias the results. For instance, countries could have poor
institutions that make it difficult for them to set up and maintain CBNRM programs for
management of their wildlife resources.21 Now, with the availability of more current and
disaggregated data on elephant counts published by the African Elephant Database, more
thorough analyses can be performed.
3.3 Hypotheses
Analyzing the management of common pool resources, Elinor Ostrom argued that a
key feature characterizing successful collective management of the commons is that indi-
viduals have the right to devise their own institutions and rules regarding deriving ben-
efits from the resource (Ostrom, 1990). CBNRM programs are intended to put this into
practice by facilitating development of community organizations that derive benefits from
wildlife resources. A successful CBNRM program should limit depletion of the resource
being managed  in this case wild elephants. The high levels of poaching recorded by the
PIKE data can arguably characterize over-extraction and a CBNRM program should lead
to an increase in elephant populations.
This rationale for setting up a CBNRM program is grounded in the significance of
defining property rights appropriately for optimal utilization of a resource (Coase, 1960).
In the context of wildlife, if property rights are defined such that the resource is privately
owned, the owner(s) extracts the stock up to the point where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost  the efficient level of extraction. However, if property rights are not defined
(or not enforced) the situation is one of open access, where resource rents are dissipated
and extraction moves beyond the level of maximum sustainable yield. If harvesting costs
20Political instability is measured by the average annual number of riots in a country and non-
representativeness through the average number of political purges over the year being considered and
five previous years.
21In addition, this paper uses elephant population data at the country level, with a total of 78 country-
year observations which would limit explanatory power.
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are sufficiently small, this can lead to extinction of the resource.22
Community-based management reduces transaction costs of establishing rights to use
and share benefits from the utilization of elephants as a natural resource. The importance
of transaction costs becomes clearer when one recognizes that elephants require a very
large territory. In Africa, where land is either state-owned, or exists as small areas owned
by individuals or communities, it is seldom the case that a single owner owns enough land
to manage an entire herd. Therefore, individuals need to negotiate with each other and
with the government to establish property rights and benefit-sharing rules. As argued in
Lueck (1994), greater heterogeneity in social structure increases transaction costs associ-
ated with such negotiations, and lowers the net benefits from a community-based manage-
ment program.
Skeptics argue that local communities may not have the expertise or resources to fight
poaching, that they may be unable to cooperate successfully, or that central governments
may not keep their commitments (Fabricius et al., 2004, Rihoy et al., 2007, Turner, 2004).
Additionally, the markets in ivory that provide some of the incentive in CBNRM pro-
grams can provide cover for illegal markets in ivory, encouraging poaching (Bulte and
Van Kooten, 1999, Hsiang and Sekar, 2016). Finally, the incentives provided by CBNRM
policies can be ambiguous, for several reasons. First, de jure property rights do not guar-
antee protection of a given species: when the costs of enforcing rights exceed the bene-
fits, open access conditions may continue (Anderson and Hill, 1983). Second, even if rights
are enforced, extinction can be an economic outcome, if discount rates are high or growth
rates low, with renewable resources effectively treated as depletable (Caughley, 1993, Hill,
2014). Third, the benefit-sharing rules of CBNRM policies and interactions between com-
munities and parks complicate the incentives for communities in ways that make the re-
turns to anti-poaching efforts ambiguous (Fischer et al., 2011).
The existing literature has explored other factors and policies influencing wildlife pop-
22See Hanley and White (2007) for the setup of the model for renewable resources.
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ulations in general, and elephant populations in particular. Leader-Williams and Albon
(1988) argues that though large nature reserves and protected areas could theoretically
lower the risk of extinction, countries with limited resources to devote to monitoring large
protected areas would do a better job of protecting its wildlife by limiting the size of these
areas. In this paper, therefore, the percentage of land designated as protected area in a
country for a year is accounted for.
Examining the effect of anti-poaching measures taken by governments with and with-
out the international ban on ivory trade, Bulte and Van Kooten (1999) argues that the
effect of the trade ban on equilibrium elephant populations is ambiguous, with the stock
under the ban being higher than that without the ban for discount rates of around 5 per-
cent or more. Although this analysis is useful in showing sensitivity of elephant stock to
anti-poaching measures and imposition of a ban on international ivory trade, the actual
value of parameters, such as the discount rate, are difficult to empirically validate at the
country level. Although barriers to trade lower welfare in a first-best world, export and
import controls may promote welfare in exporting countries if, for example, enforcement of
property rights is imperfect (Bulte and Barbier, 2005). Using a dynamic model of an open
access resource that can produce a storable good, Kremer and Morcom (2000) show that
the cheapest way for governments to avoid extinction of elephants may be to commit to
tough anti-poaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. Governments with
less credibility should accumulate a sufficient stockpile of the storable good and threaten
to sell it should the population fall. A recent empirical study using data on the Propor-
tion of Illegally Killed Elephants (PIKE) finds that a one-shot legal sale of ivory stocks in
the year 2008 corresponded to a 66% increase in illegal ivory production across Africa and
Asia (Hsiang and Sekar, 2016). A reading of this literature shows that the effect of the ban
on international trade in ivory is ambiguous, but it is clearly an important factor affecting
individuals' incentives to engage in conservation or poaching of wildlife. Therefore, this pa-
per controls for whether a country is a signatory to the CITES ban on international trade
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in ivory during a given year. Other factors that the existing literature examines that have
been examined vis-a-vis their effect on wildlife populations include economic conditions
(McPherson and Nieswiadomy, 2000), governance (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009) and the
relative importances of forest resources in a country's GDP (Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006).
These factors are also accounted for in this paper.
Despite the importance of the question, surprisingly little empirical evidence is avail-
able about the success or failures of CBNRM policies at protecting elephant populations.
Case studies have generally supported the success of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program
and other CBNRM programs, especially in the early years (Taylor, 2009). However, many
case studies focus more on economic than conservation outcomes (Fabricius et al., 2004).
To the best of my knowledge, McPherson and Nieswiadomy (2000) provide the only quan-
titative evidence of the relationship between CBNRM programs and elephant populations.
They used country-level data, regressing 1981-89 and 1989-94 changes in elephant popula-
tions on indicator variables for whether a country had CBNRM policies and other controls,
with a total of 78 observations. They find that countries with CBNRM policies have more
rapid growth rates in elephant populations. However, these data are now 25 years old, do
not explain within-country differences, and came only at beginning of many CBNRM pro-
grams. Thus, the actual effect of CBNRM programs on wildlife like the African elephant is
still an open question.
3.4 Data
Data on elephant populations has been collected at the area level from the African Ele-
phant Database for the years 1985-2012. The full dataset includes survey counts at 589
areas across the 38 countries with recorded elephant populations (these countries are col-
lectively referred to as elephant range states). The dataset has 1,136 area-year observa-
tions. 325 areas have observations for one year, 99 for two, and so on, as shown in Table 7
below.
38
Table 7: Frequency of Distinct Area-Year Observations
# of areas %age of total # of areas # of annual obs. for each
325 55.18 1
99 16.81 2
79 13.41 3
55 9.34 4
30 5.09 5
1 0.17 6
589 100 1,136
Elephant counts are generated using different survey methods that vary in their degree
of reliability from A to E (best to worst). Category A surveys (28.35 percent of observa-
tions) have the highest degree of reliability and are conducted through aerial or ground
total counts, or individual registration. Those in categories B (30.11 percent) and C (4.93
percent) mainly include aerial or ground sample counts or dung counts. Categories D and
E primarily include counts generated through informed guesses or other guesses (Blanc
et al., 2007).
The raw distribution of elephant counts is strongly positively skewed. Therefore, in
order to make the OLS regressions in the empirical analysis appropriate, a log-transform
(Figure 6) of this variable is used in the empirical analysis and the coefficients are inter-
preted accordingly.
There are a total of 56 area-year observations in which the number of elephants is recorded
as 0. Thus, in the estimation all elephant counts are augmented by 1 to ensure that these
observations do not drive the results.
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Figure 6: Histogram of Log of Elephant Counts
Figure 7 shows the full dataset of area-year elephant counts with blue diamonds mark-
ing area-year counts for which there are no CBNRM projects and red squares marking ob-
servations where CBNRM projects are present. From this figure, it is clear that the num-
ber of CBNRM projects have increased over the years, as more and more countries imple-
ment such programs. However, the effect on elephant counts is not apparent without more
rigorous evaluation.
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Figure 7: Area-level Elephant Counts Over Time
3.4.1 CBNRM
A number of published reports, case studies and articles have been used to codify whether
an area with a recorded elephant population has had a CBNRM project implemented in or
around it during a particular year. In the analysis, CBNRM is a dummy that varies at the
area-year level. It takes on the value 1 if an area has a documented CBNRM program in a
particular year, and 0 otherwise. Fifteen countries do not have a CBNRM project recorded
in any of their areas for any year in the sample.23
Country-year controls
A dummy for the CITES ban on international ivory trade takes on a value of one if
elephants are listed in Appendix I in a country during a given year, and zero otherwise.
23Countries without any recorded CBNRM projects in the area-year observations under consideration
include Angola, Chad, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Togo.
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Data on gross domestic product, gross national income, protected area (as a percentage
of total area), and forest rent (as a percentage of GDP) are collected at the country-year
level from the World Bank's publicly available data. Protected areas refers to totally or
partially protected areas of at least 1,000 hectares that are designated by national au-
thorities as reserves with limited public access and is expressed as a percentage of total
land acreage of a country. Marine areas, unclassified areas, littoral (intertidal) areas, and
sites protected under local or provincial law are excluded. Forest rent (as a percentage
of GDP) is measured as round-wood harvest times the product of average prices and a
region-specific rental rate. The estimates of rents are calculated by estimating the world
price of units of round-wood and subtracting estimates of average unit costs of extraction
or harvesting cost. These unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantities coun-
tries extract or harvest to determine the value of rent for each commodity.
Governance indicators have been obtained from World Bank's World Governance Indi-
cators (WGI) and also from the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFW)
database. The WGI are standardized variables centered at 0. The two WGI indicators
used measure (i) the absence of corruption and (ii) the absence of violence or terrorism.
The EFW index addresses five areas of freedom which are aggregated into a single sum-
mary index of economic freedom. These areas are (1) size of government; (2) legal struc-
ture and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade in-
ternationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business. The underlying component
data are converted to a scale from 1 (representing the least free) to 10 (most free).
3.4.2 Time-invariant Factors
Fractionalization data is collected from Alesina's database (Alesina et al., 2003). This
data is a measure of how heterogeneous a country is in terms of ethno-linguistic categories.
For country j, fractionalization is calculated as Fracj = 1 −
∑N
i=1 s
2
ij, where sij is the
share of ethno-linguistic group i in the population of country j. Thus, Fracj ∈ [0, 1) and it
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increases with greater heterogeneity. Since fractionalization data does not vary with time,
its effect can only be measured through an interaction with the CBNRM dummy variable.
Table 8: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max Count
Log(ElephantCount) 5.2730 2.3634 0 11.700 1136
Log(GDPpc) 6.4762 1.0475 4.7143 9.2613 1131
Log(GNIpc) 7.8291 0.8837 5.9789 9.9366 948
Forest Rent 6.2758 6.0887 0.2790 40.200 1122
Protected Area (% of land area) 16.0305 9.3258 0.5265 37.1897 1032
Fractionalization 0.7269 0.1599 0.0582 0.9302 1136
Gov(NoCorruption) -0.5673 0.5634 -1.8995 1.0033 637
Gov(NoViolence) -0.4883 0.7690 -2.9948 0.9631 636
Fraser Index of Governance 6.0129 1.1651 2.95 7.64 551
CBNRM Yes(427) No (709)
CITES Ban Yes(915) No (221)
Trophy Hunting Yes(623) No(513)
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Average Effects
The effect of CBNRM programs on elephant populations is identified using a fixed-
effects difference-in-differences specification that controls for area-level unobserved het-
erogeneity. Moreover, the long-term impacts of CBNRM programs are measured through
an event-study analysis. The estimating equations are as follows:
log(Yijt + 1) = β1 + CBNRMijt ∗ β2 + CITESjt ∗ β3 +Xjt ∗ β7 + λt + ωi + ijt (10)
log(Yijt + 1) =β1 + Y rsSinceCBNRMijt ∗ β2 + Y rsBeforeCBNRMijt ∗ β3
+ CITESjt ∗ β4 +Xjt ∗ β5 + λt + ωi + ijt
(11)
where Yijt is the elephant population at area i in country j in year t, CBNRMijt in-
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dicates whether an area i in country j has a CBNRM project in or around it in year t,
Y rsSinceCBNRMijt measures the number of years since the CBNRM project was imple-
mented, and Y rsBeforeCBNRMijt measures the number of years before the project was
implemented. CITESjt is an indicator for whether ivory export was disallowed in country
j in year t, Xjt includes country-year covariates, λt are year dummies, and ωi denotes area
fixed effects in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9: Fixed-effects Difference-in-differences Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
CBNRM 0.344∗∗ 0.362∗∗ 0.341∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.232 0.235
(0.167) (0.165) (0.167) (0.163) (0.281) (0.279)
CITES Ban -0.333 -0.473∗∗ -0.660∗
(0.209) (0.220) (0.339)
Log(GDPpc) 0.250 0.384
∗ -0.0657 -0.0759
(0.227) (0.232) (0.479) (0.477)
Forest Rent 0.0342 0.0212
(0.0515) (0.0535)
Gov(NoCorruption) -0.366 -0.218
(0.313) (0.338)
Gov(NoViolence) 0.0401 -0.0234
(0.271) (0.282)
Constant 6.748∗∗∗ 6.652∗∗∗ 5.110∗∗∗ 4.084∗∗∗ 5.450 6.267∗
(0.352) (0.359) (1.514) (1.571) (3.397) (3.443)
Observations 1136 1136 1131 1131 631 631
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.075 0.073 0.081 0.041 0.044
Standard errors in parentheses
FE Diff in Diff. All Specs include Year Dummies
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Fixed-effects Event-time Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
Years Since CBNRM -0.0249 -0.0249 -0.0271 -0.0275 0.0906∗ 0.0854∗
(0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0477) (0.0507)
Years Before CBNRM 0.0324 0.0243 0.0470∗ 0.0299 -0.0862 -0.0853
(0.0202) (0.0282) (0.0249) (0.0290) (0.0602) (0.0598)
CITES Ban -0.142 -0.369 -0.342
(0.304) (0.315) (0.472)
Log(GDPpc) 0.453 0.572
∗ -0.940 -0.954
(0.327) (0.340) (0.621) (0.623)
Forest Rent 0.0390 0.0243
(0.0708) (0.0783)
Gov(NoCorruption) 0.173 0.249
(0.403) (0.416)
Gov(NoViolence) -0.117 -0.123
(0.354) (0.359)
Constant 6.444∗∗∗ 6.525∗∗∗ 3.209 2.566 11.80∗∗∗ 12.33∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.414) (2.432) (2.471) (4.523) (4.621)
Observations 600 600 600 600 371 371
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.075 0.082 0.083 0.057 0.055
Standard errors in parentheses
FE Event Time Analysis with Placebo. All Specs include Year Dummies
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results from the fixed-effects specification shows that the effect of CBNRM on ele-
phant populations is positive, with a park having such a project containing approximately
40% more elephants compared to one without a CBNRM project. The event-study anal-
ysis further indicates that the effect of CBNRM programs increases over time, with each
additional year of existence of the project increasing the count of elephants by 9%, while
the placebo coefficient testing the effect of years leading up to a CBNRM project not be-
ing statistically significant. Conversely, the ban on international ivory trade has negative
effects on elephant counts.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Effects
To identify heterogeneous impacts, the empirical approach is a difference-in-differences
estimation of change in elephant populations at survey areas that have CBNRM programs
situated around them and those that do not. See Hansen (2007) for an exposition on the
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method. The estimating equation is
log(Yijt + 1) =β1 + CBNRMijt ∗ β2 + CBNRMijt ∗ CITESjt ∗ β3 + CITESjt ∗ β4
+ CBNRMijt ∗ Fracj ∗ β5 + CBNRMijt ∗ TrophyElephj ∗ β6
Xjt ∗ β7 + λt + ωi + ijt
(12)
where Yijt is the elephant population at area i in country j in year t, CBNRMijt indicates
whether an area i in country j has a CBNRM project in or around it in year t, CITESjt
is an indicator for whether ivory export was disallowed in country j in year t, Fracjt is the
level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in country j, TrophyElephj is an indicator for
whether trophy hunting of elephants is permitted in country j, Xjt includes country-year
covariates, and λt and ωi are year and area fixed effects, respectively.
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Table 11: Heterogeneous effects of CBNRM (Unrestricted Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
CBNRM 1.182 1.182 0.883 0.883
(1.626) (1.315) (1.239) (1.249)
CBNRM#CITESBan 0.917∗∗ 0.917 1.151∗ 1.151∗
(0.437) (0.588) (0.598) (0.603)
CBNRM#Fractionalization -2.209 -2.209 -1.957 -1.957
(1.983) (1.791) (1.698) (1.712)
CBNRM#TrophyHuntingEleph 0.155 0.155 -0.0402 -0.0402
(0.545) (0.551) (0.518) (0.522)
Fraser Index of Governance 0.0265 0.0265 0.190 0.190
(0.229) (0.238) (0.248) (0.250)
Log(GNIpc) 1.258 1.258 0.915 0.915
(0.932) (0.783) (0.776) (0.782)
Protected Area (% of land area) -0.0361 -0.0361 -0.0604 -0.0604
(0.0751) (0.0734) (0.0680) (0.0685)
Forest Rent (% of GDP) 0.104∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.0553 0.0553
(0.0457) (0.0469) (0.0557) (0.0561)
CITES Ban -1.338∗ -1.338∗
(0.763) (0.769)
Constant -5.182 -5.182 -1.275 -1.113
(7.758) (6.788) (7.132) (7.182)
Observations 459 459 459 359
Adjusted R2 -1.738 0.091 0.112 0.099
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; All specifications include year dummies and Area FEs
Column 1: No CITES Ban Dummy, No Robust SEs; Column 2: No CITES Ban Dummy, Robust SEs
Column 3: CITES Ban Dummy, Robust SEs
Column 4: Column 3 regression restricted to areas with observations for more than one year.
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Table 12: Heterogeneous effects of CBNRM (Sample restricted to reliable surveys)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
CBNRM 1.685 1.685 1.500 1.500
(1.348) (1.134) (1.112) (1.121)
CBNRM#CITESBan -0.122 -0.122 0.0630 0.0630
(0.424) (0.427) (0.427) (0.431)
CBNRM#Fractionalization -1.504 -1.504 -1.422 -1.422
(1.667) (1.375) (1.361) (1.371)
CBNRM#TrophyHuntingEleph -0.693 -0.693∗∗ -0.739∗∗ -0.739∗∗
(0.514) (0.312) (0.324) (0.326)
Fraser Index of Governance 0.0624 0.0624 0.171 0.171
(0.228) (0.191) (0.198) (0.199)
Log(GNIpc) 1.232 1.232∗∗ 0.987 0.987
(0.932) (0.623) (0.650) (0.655)
Protected Area (% of land area) -0.0999 -0.0999∗ -0.105∗ -0.105∗
(0.0661) (0.0562) (0.0547) (0.0551)
Forest Rent (% of GDP) 0.0618 0.0618∗∗ 0.0262 0.0262
(0.0418) (0.0289) (0.0254) (0.0256)
CITES Ban -0.810∗ -0.810∗
(0.468) (0.471)
Constant -3.544 -3.544 -0.994 -0.766
(7.917) (5.500) (5.847) (5.867)
Observations 350 350 350 292
Adjusted R2 -1.486 0.174 0.181 0.170
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; All specifications include year dummies and Area FEs
Column 1: No CITES Ban Dummy, No Robust SEs; Column 2: No CITES Ban Dummy, Robust SEs
Column 3: CITES Ban Dummy, Robust SEs
Column 4: Column 3 regression restricted to areas with observations for more than one year.
The multiple specifications show the effects of: (1) including the CITES ban dummy
in the specification in Columns 3 and 4, (2) including robust standard errors in Column
2, 3 and 4 and (3) including only those areas which have elephant counts for more than
one year. Since area fixed effects are included in the specifications, Columns 3 and 4 have
the same coefficients with slightly different standard errors. Column 3 in Table 12 includes
results from reliable surveys only and has the highest adjusted R2.
Alternative specifications focusing on different regions and using unadjusted elephant
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counts are reported in Appendix B (Tables 23, 24 and 25). Specifications testing for the
different interaction effects in isolation are also included in Appendix B (Tables 26, 27 and
28).
3.6 Conclusions
The pooled OLS and fixed-effects difference-in-differences analyses show that on aver-
age CBNRM has positive effects which are not statistically significant when country-level
covariates are included. The event-study analyses, on the other hand, reveal that the posi-
tive effects of CBNRM projects emerge over time, pointing towards the long-term benefits
of these programs on elephant populations.
The analyses of heterogeneous impacts reveal that the positive impacts of CBNRM
are mitigated as the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization of a country increases. In-
tuitively, this indicates that it is more difficult to reap benefits of CBNRM if the project
involves negotiating with more heterogeneous groups of people with different tastes and
preferences. Moreover, the benefits of CBNRM are also mitigated by top-down policies like
the CITES ban on international ivory trade.24
Joint hypothesis tests can help to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the magni-
tude of the effect of CBNRM on elephant populations conditional on values of the covari-
ates interacting with the CBNRM dummy. For instance, if a country is a signatory to the
CITES ban on international ivory trade, has a fractionalization level that is one standard
deviation less than the mean (Fracj = 0.56), and allows trophy hunting of elephants, the
effect of CBNRM is positive and significant at the 10 percent level.25 The net effect of a
CBNRM project is a 2.9 percent increase in elephant counts.
The coefficients on other controls are in the expected directions. Higher GNI, better
24Looking at the impact of the CITES ban on ivory trade, the coefficient on the CITES ban dummy is
negative and significant at the 10% level, and the interaction term indicates that this effect is somewhat
mitigated in the presence of CBNRM activities.
25The null hypothesis is H0 : β2 + β3 + β5 ∗ 0.56+ β6 = 0 where β's represent coefficients from esimation
equation (1).
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governance, and higher forest rent (as a share of GDP) are associated with higher elephant
populations, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. A one percent increase
in share of land classified as Protected Area is associated with a 10.5 percent decrease in
elephant populations, and this is significant at the 10 percent level.
Taken together, the results suggest that top-down measures like a ban on international
ivory trade or designating land as Protected Area (which severely limits rights to benefit
from forest resources) has a detrimental effect on elephant populations. CBNRM, as cur-
rently implemented, has had positive impacts. The magnitude of the impact is, however,
lesser with higher heterogeneity in a country's social structure. The positive impact of CB-
NRM is lower in countries that allow trophy hunting, although the effect of trophy hunting
alone is not interpretable in the current analysis because there is no temporal variation in
the legal status of trophy hunting making it perfectly collinear with area fixed effects.
This analysis is the first step towards developing a strong empirical analysis of the ef-
fect of community-based programs on wildlife populations. Future work should focus on
developing geo-spatial linkages between distinct elephant herds and contiguous commu-
nity lands implementing benefit-sharing or devolution of property rights over wildlife. The
linked data should also take into account the fractionalization of particular communities
and institutional factors at a disaggregated level to have a better understanding of the in-
tricacies of CBNRM projects. While current research is restricted mostly to field surveys
and case studies at specific project sites, more comprehensive empirical analyses could lead
to a better understanding of the big picture in terms of how this approach has performed
over the last three decades.
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4 Priming and Pro-social Behavior in Qatar26
4.1 Introduction
Non-pecuniary behavioral nudges designed to affect economic decisions and increase so-
cial welfare is now well recognized and commonly used by policymakers all over the world
(Bank, 2014). In environment and energy policy in particular, the number of behavioral
interventions has increased exponentially over the last two decades. Many seminal articles
in this literature have focused on interventions in western and developed countries,27 with
relatively less attention being paid to how behavioral interventions can be adapted to suit
different institutional and cultural norms.
Against this backdrop, this chapter reports the effectiveness of using messages priming
different aspects of Qatari individuals' identity on increasing pro-social behavior; (i) reli-
gious values and (ii) national pride. The experiment's results are meant to inform priors
regarding the effectiveness of similar priming messages that are currently being delivered
in a randomized control trial on residential energy use in Qatar.
Charitable giving is a measure of pro-social behavior that has been tried and tested in
both laboratory and field experiments. Within the context of the massive body of liter-
ature on charitable giving, this chapter examines the effects of priming. Benjamin et al.
(2010) forms the basis for testable hypotheses by developing a simple theoretical model
predicting the marginal effects of priming social category on preferences. In a later paper,
the authors find that religious priming affects voluntary contributions to a public good
(Benjamin et al., 2016). Lambarraa and Riener (2015) finds that individuals increase do-
nations when religious identity is made salient. Kessler and Milkman (2016) shows evi-
dence that appeals priming an individual's identity as a previous donor to a charity or as a
26I would like to thank Michael Price and Ahmed Khalifa for their guidance on this project. This re-
search was made possible through grant number NPRP9-232-5-026 from the Qatar National Research
Fund, Qatar Foundation. The statements and opinions expressed herein are those of the author's alone
and do not necessarily reflect those of Qatar Foundation.
27See for example Allcott (2011); Allcott and Rogers (2014); Jessoe and Rapson (2014); Ferraro and
Price (2013); Ayres et al. (2013); Schultz et al. (2007).
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member of a local community generate more donations.
This experiment contributes to that body of work on three fronts. First, we use more
direct religious primes than Benjamin et al. (2016). Instead of having subjects unscramble
sentences containing words with a religious connotation, we use a passage taken directly
from the Quran. Second, in addition to the religious prime, we also test the effect of prim-
ing national identity using a quote from the founder of Qatar emphasizing the importance
of charity in the region. Finally, this is the first study of its kind in Qatar and builds evi-
dence on the effect of priming in non-Western social and cultural contexts.
4.2 Experiment Design
A total of 226 subjects were invited to a computer laboratory in Qatar University to
participate in experiments that were operationalized using zTree version 4.6.1 (Fischbacher,
2007). Out of the 226 subjects, 211 were recruited from the population of students and
staff in Qatar University. This is referred to as the QU Sample in the analysis. The re-
maining 15 subjects participated from a sample of customers of the major utility company
in Qatar who had previously responded to a telephonic survey. The experiments were run
over March and April, 2019.
In each session, before beginning the experiment, subjects were requested to sign con-
sent forms. They were provided instructions for the experiment which were projected on
a screen and also read out to them in Arabic and English. The English version of the in-
structions are included in Appendix C.
Each subject participated in three choice tasks: (i) a dictator game where subjects had
the choice to donate any part of a given endowment to a well-known charitable organiza-
tion in Qatar, (ii) a risk-preference elicitation task (Eckel and Grossman, 2002), and (iii)
a time-preference elicitation task where subjects indicated their preference over smaller-
sooner or larger-later amounts of money  with a delay of three months and the sooner
payment varying between today and 1 month from today (Meier and Sprenger, 2010).
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The specific choices and payoffs in the second and third task are specified in Tables 29 and
30 in Appendix C.
The stakes for each task are designed to be similar in expectation. After subjects had
completed all their choices, one of the three tasks was selected randomly to determine
their earnings from the experiment. If the dictator game was selected, the subject received
the amount they had decided to keep, and the donation indicated by them was made to
the charity. If the risk-preference task was selected, the smaller or larger amount corre-
sponding to the option chosen by the subject was chosen randomly. Finally, if the time
preference task was selected, one of the 20 rows was chosen at random and the subject
received the earnings (at the time delay, if any) corresponding to their choice in the ran-
domly chosen row.
In the dictator game, subjects had an endowment of 150 Qatari Rials (QR)28 and asked
to indicate how much of that endowment they wanted to donate. A between-subject de-
sign was used to identify differences in charitable contributions among individuals who saw
either (i) a religious message containing a passage in the Qu'ran that emphasizes the norm
of charitable donation in Islam, or (ii) a message priming national identity and the im-
portance of charity in Qatar from the founder of the state of Qatar  Sheikh Jassim bin
Mohammed Al Thani, or (iii) no message.
Figure 8: Religious Message
28At the time, the exchange rate between Qatari Rial (QR) and US Dollars was QR3.64 = $1.
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Figure 9: National Identity Message
After completing all choices in the experiment, subjects were requested to fill out a sur-
vey that included demographic questions as well as questions regarding beliefs about rela-
tive energy use (Byrne et al., 2018), their attitudes toward anthropogenic climate change,
and the energy savings of several technologies (Attari et al., 2010). Additionally, subjects
were given an incentive of QR 20 to provide the most recent copy of their electricity bill.
4.3 Results
As Figure 10 and Table 13 show, the average donation by subjects who saw the reli-
gious message was higher than that of subjects in the control group. Subjects who saw the
national identity message also donated more on average than the control group, but less
than the religious message treatment.
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Figure 10: Average Donation by Treatment
Table 13: Summary Statistics of Donation by Treatment
Full Sample Full with demographics QU Sample QU with demographics
No Message
Average Donation 48.53 48.21 46.24 45.83
S.D. (3.981) (4.102) (3.809) (3.927)
Num. of Subjects [94] [91] [90] [87]
Religious Message
Average Donation 67.26 66.88 65.10 65.86
S.D. (6.012) (6.498) (6.197) (6.791)
Num. of Subjects [69] [58] [61] [51]
National Identity Message
Average Donation 59.10 58.53 58.38 58.53
S.D. (6.028) (6.598) (6.107) (6.598)
Num. of Subjects [63] [53] [60] [53]
Total Num. of Subjects 226 202 211 191
These overall results are further analyzed using OLS and two-limit Tobit regressions
in Tables 14 through 17. In Column (2) of each table, individuals' degree of risk seeking
(identified from the risk task) and an indicator for whether they are present-biased (iden-
tified from the time preference task) are included as covariates. In Column (3), (4), and
(5), the sample is restricted to those individuals who provided demographic information on
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gender, education, religion, residence type (flat or villa), and nationality.
Table 14: Average Effects of Treatment on Donation (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Full Full with demog. Full with demog. Full with demog.
Religious Message 18.73∗∗ 18.34∗∗ 18.67∗∗ 21.86∗∗∗ 21.93∗∗∗
(7.211) (7.306) (7.683) (7.880) (7.897)
National Identity Message 10.56 9.676 10.32 11.87 10.42
(7.220) (7.507) (7.762) (8.032) (8.512)
Degree of Risk Seeking 1.226 1.504
(2.175) (2.386)
Present Bias -6.993 -7.351
(7.812) (7.692)
Female 5.399 7.123
(7.457) (7.698)
Non-Muslim -46.91∗∗∗ -46.81∗∗∗
(9.746) (9.894)
Villa Resident -9.674 -9.234
(7.451) (7.516)
Qatari National 19.33∗∗ 17.90∗∗
(7.602) (7.755)
Education 4.523 4.426
(3.043) (3.062)
Constant 48.53∗∗∗ 46.63∗∗∗ 48.21∗∗∗ 29.29∗∗ 26.68∗∗
(3.986) (7.159) (4.110) (11.71) (12.74)
Observations 226 226 202 202 202
R2 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.081 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Tobit Average Marginal Effects (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Full Full with demog. Full with demog. Full with demog.
Religious Message 21.92∗∗ 21.50∗∗ 21.39∗∗ 24.87∗∗∗ 25.04∗∗∗
(8.617) (8.687) (9.102) (9.260) (9.247)
National Identity Message 12.47 11.40 11.90 14.08 12.30
(8.472) (8.773) (9.042) (9.302) (9.845)
Degree of Risk Seeking 1.797 2.180
(2.625) (2.831)
Present Bias -8.374 -8.440
(9.203) (9.088)
Female 5.183 7.359
(8.663) (8.902)
Non-Muslim -47.39∗∗∗ -46.82∗∗∗
(11.81) (11.90)
Villa Resident -9.063 -8.496
(8.724) (8.784)
Qatari National 21.99∗∗ 20.10∗∗
(8.884) (9.025)
Education 5.117 4.938
(3.625) (3.643)
Observations 226 226 202 202 202
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Average Effects of Treatment (QU Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QU QU QU with demog. QU with demog. QU with demog.
Religious Message 18.85∗∗ 18.81∗∗ 20.04∗∗ 23.87∗∗∗ 24.19∗∗∗
(7.272) (7.409) (7.837) (7.838) (7.866)
National Identity Message 12.14∗ 11.66 12.70∗ 15.19∗ 14.12∗
(7.194) (7.501) (7.673) (7.864) (8.368)
Degree of Risk Seeking 1.478 2.153
(2.195) (2.450)
Present Bias -3.915 -4.579
(7.988) (7.880)
Female 7.534 9.102
(7.464) (7.684)
Non-Muslim -40.18∗∗∗ -39.21∗∗∗
(9.068) (8.960)
Villa Resident -6.719 -6.415
(7.260) (7.290)
Qatari National 21.68∗∗∗ 20.19∗∗∗
(7.538) (7.683)
Education 4.916 4.788
(3.033) (3.051)
Constant 46.24∗∗∗ 43.05∗∗∗ 45.83∗∗∗ 20.60∗ 15.96
(3.815) (7.114) (3.935) (11.42) (12.18)
Observations 211 211 191 191 191
R2 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.110 0.116
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Tobit Average Marginal Effects (QU Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
QU QU QU with demog. QU with demog. QU with demog.
Religious Message 21.59∗∗ 21.62∗∗ 22.62∗∗ 26.78∗∗∗ 27.31∗∗∗
(8.519) (8.646) (9.167) (9.096) (9.111)
National Identity Message 14.07∗ 13.52 14.59 17.80∗ 16.50∗
(8.305) (8.620) (8.850) (9.028) (9.582)
Degree of Risk Seeking 2.098 2.958
(2.583) (2.867)
Present Bias -4.474 -5.024
(9.250) (9.157)
Female 7.783 9.766
(8.536) (8.753)
Non-Muslim -39.10∗∗∗ -37.48∗∗∗
(10.89) (10.68)
Villa Resident -5.405 -5.051
(8.425) (8.452)
Qatari National 24.53∗∗∗ 22.61∗∗
(8.699) (8.817)
Education 5.477 5.271
(3.560) (3.575)
Observations 211 211 191 191 191
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The main results from the tables above are as follows:
Result 1: The religious message causes a statistically significant increase in donations
in all specifications. The effect gets stronger as controls are included.
Result 2: The national identity message has positive effects on average, but statistically
significant only in the sample of individuals recruited from Qatar University The effect
gets stronger as controls are included.
Result 3: Qatari nationals and Muslims donate more on average.
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4.4 Discussion
The experiment shows that priming religious values has strong positive impacts on pro-
social behavior in Qatar, as measured by individuals' decision to contribute to a charity.
This suggests that fundraising organizations in Islamic societies can use messages priming
religious value to increase charitable contributions. In the context of earlier literature, the
study shows that direct messages from the Quran are effective in increasing giving to a
real charity whereas (Benjamin et al., 2016) find that giving to a paired recipient in the
experiment does not change due to their religious prime instrument.
Additionally, the results of this experiment can inform priors regarding the effects of
similar primes on energy conservation, which is a different domain of pro-social behavior.
A particularly interesting aspect of energy use in Qatar is that Qatari nationals do not
pay for the electricity. This allows the field experiment to block the cost-saving channel
of response to behavioral interventions designed to reduce energy use.On April 30 2019,
the first round of text messages were sent out to around 5,000 households in Qatar. The
households were equally split into two treatment groups, (i) a message priming religious
motivations to use less electricity, and (ii) a message priming national identity stating that
Qatar's vision is to reduce emissions from burning fossil fuels. Given the findings in the
laboratory experiment, and assuming that the effects on charitable giving occur in the
same direction as energy conservation, the religious message is expected to affect a sig-
nificant reduction in energy use.
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5 Conclusion
The three chapters in this dissertation demonstrate that appropriately designed incen-
tives and non-pecuniary nudges have a significant role to play in increasing pro-social be-
havior and mitigating social dilemmas. However, effects of incentives and nudges can de-
pend crucially on institutional structure, cultural norms, and individual behavioral types.
Explicitly identifying the margins on which treatments have heterogeneous effects on be-
havior can help policymakers tailor programs to groups or contexts in ways that make
them more effective.
Several studies on the mitigation of social dilemmas using laboratory experiments lend
themselves readily to replication using artefactual and framed field experiments providing
promising avenues to build evidence on the external validity. With the proliferation of de-
signing and testing nudges in specific contexts, one promising avenue of research that has
gained some attention is the spillover effects of nudges across different decision domains.
Another avenue of research that should be explored more is the application of experimen-
tal methods to understand firm behavior. For example, in terms of mitigating pollutant
emissions, firms often have much higher levels of emissions than individual consumers. So,
moderate percentage reductions in emissions by firms would have much larger environmen-
tal impacts.
Randomization is well understood as the perfect instrumental variable to identify and
measure the causal effects of policies and incentive schemes. However, there are cases where
randomized experiments cannot be performed or may not be scaled up sufficiently to pro-
vide actionable evidence in and of themselves. This should create strong preferences for
complementing experimental tools with quasi-experimental empirical analyses to facilitate
a deeper, and more generalizable understanding of environmental problems and their po-
tential solutions.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A
Theoretical Model
The expected value from the game is
EVi = p
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
− αf(hi)
]
+ (1− p)
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]]
(13)
Assuming
∂hj
∂hi
= 0, in the quota regimes given by 2 and 3, differentiating 13 with re-
spect to hi:
∂EVi
∂hi
= 1−M/N − αp = N(1− αp)−M
N
(14)
If 1 − αp >, = or < M/N , the expected value maximizing harvest level is hmax,
h ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 10} or 0, respectively.
In the quota regime given by 4, differentiating 13 with respect to hi:
∂EVi
∂hi
= 1−M/N + p/N − αp = N(1− αp)−M + p
N
(15)
If 1 − αp >, = or < M−p
N
, the expected value maximizing harvest level is hmax,
h ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 10} or 0, respectively.
Expected Utility
The corresponding expected utility from the game is
EUi = pUi
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
− αf(hi)
]
+ (1− p)Ui
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]]
(16)
Assuming
∂hj
∂hi
= 0, in quota regimes 2 and 3,
∂EUi
∂hi
= pU ′(A)[1−M/N − α] + (1− p)U ′(B)[1−M/N ] (17)
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where A = e+ hi +
M
N
[ N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
− αf(hi) and B = e+ hi + M
N
[ N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
A is agent i's income level after sanction or reward and B is agent i's income level
without sanctions or rewards.
∂EUi
∂hi
= [1−M/N ][pU ′(A) + (1− p)U ′(B)]− pαU ′(A)
= [(N −M)/N ][pU ′(A)−NpαU ′(A) + (1− p)U ′(B)]
=
(N −M)
N
[
p(1−Nα)U ′(A) + (1− p)U ′(B)
]
Now, if (N−M)
N
> 0, ∂EUi
∂hi
≤ (>)0 if
p(1−Nα)U ′(A) + (1− p)U ′(B) ≤ (>)0
(1− p)U ′(B) ≤ (>)p(Nα− 1)U ′(A) ⇐⇒ (1− p)
p(Nα− 1) ≤ (>)
U ′(A)
U ′(B)
Since A < B, assuming risk averse (seeking) preferences over outcomes, i.e. U(.) ≤ 0,
U'(A) ≥ U'(B).
If p = 0 (Baseline case with no sanctions), equation 17 implies
∂EUi
∂hi
> 0 ∀ hi
So the Nash equilibrium harvest level in the baseline is
h∗i = hmax ∀ i ∈ {1, 2...N}
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If (p, α) ≡ (1/8, 2) or (p, α) ≡ (1/4, 1),
1− p
p(Nα− 1) = 1 ≤ (>)
U ′(A)
U ′(B)
⇐⇒ U ′(A) ≥ (<)U ′(B)
If (p, α) ≡ (1/4, 2),
1− p
p(Nα− 1) =
3
7
≤ (>)U
′(A)
U ′(B)
⇐⇒ U ′(A) ≥ (<)U ′(B)
So, the Nash equilibrium harvest level assuming a risk-averse EU maximizer in the
treatments with sanctions is always
h∗i = 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2...N}
.
In quota regime 4,
EUi = pUi
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
− α
(
hi −
∑N
j=1 hj
N
)]
+ (1− p)Ui
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]]
(18)
∂EUi
∂hi
= pU ′(A)
[
1−M/N − αN − 1
N
]
+ (1− p)U ′(B)[1−M/N ] (19)
∂EUi
∂hi
= pU ′(A)
[
N −M + α−Nα
N
]
+ (1− p)U ′(B)
[
N −M
N
]
(20)
∂EUi
∂hi
=
(N −M)
N
[
pU ′(A) + (1− p)U ′(B)
]
− (N − 1)
N
αpU ′(A) (21)
∂EUi
∂hi
= 1/N
[
(N −M)(pU ′(A) + (1− p)U ′(B))− (N − 1)αpU ′(A)
]
(22)
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∂EUi
∂hi
= 1/N
[
pU ′(A)(N −M − (N − 1)α) + (1− p)U ′(B)(N −M)
]
(23)
Now, if p = 0, ∂EUi
hi
= U ′(B)(1 −M/N) which is positive since N > M . Therefore, in
the baseline, h∗i = hmax.
If p = 1/8, α = 2, N = 4 and M = 2, ∂EUi
∂hi
= 3/2U ′(B) − 1/4U ′(A) > (=)[<]0 ⇐⇒
6U ′(B) > (=)[<]U ′(A). Since B = A + α(hi − H0), where H0 =
∑N
j =1hj
N
, A can be either
less or greater than B depending on the endogenous quota. So the optimal harvest level
would depend on others' decisions to harvest and the resultant quota level. The results are
similar for (p = 1/4;α = 1) and (p = 1/4;α = 2).
Dual Expected Utility
Using the Dual Expected Utility model (Yaari, 1987) as an alternative to EUT (equa-
tion 24), rank alternatives from best to worst, consider the utility function to be linear in
payoffs (U(w) = w) and transform probabilities using a weighting function ω ≡ ω(p),
where ω(0) = 0 and ω(1) = 1.
DEUi = ωi(1− p).
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]]
+ [1− ωi(1− p)].
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)− αf(hi)
]]
(24)
∂DEUi
∂hi
= [1−M/N ][ωi(1− p)] + [1−M/N − α][1− ωi(1− p)] (25)
∂DEUi
∂hi
≤ (>)0 ⇐⇒ (N −M)
Nα
≤ (>)[1− ωi(1− p)]
If p = 0 (Baseline case with no sanctions), equation 25 implies
∂DEUi
∂hi
> 0 ∀ hi
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So the Nash equilibrium harvest level in the baseline is
h∗i = hmax ∀ i ∈ {1, 2...N}
If (p, α) ≡ (1/8, 2),
∂DEUi
∂hi
= 1/2 + 2[ωi(1− 1/8)− 1]
∂DEUi
∂hi
≤ (>)0 ⇐⇒ 1/4 ≤ (>)1− ωi(7/8) ⇐⇒ ωi(7/8) ≤ (>)3/4 (26)
If (p, α) ≡ (1/4, 1),
∂DEUi
∂hi
= 1/2 + [ωi(1− 1/4)− 1]
∂DEUi
∂hi
≤ (>)0 ⇐⇒ 1/2 ≤ (>)1− ωi(3/4) ⇐⇒ ωi(3/4) ≤ (>)1/2 (27)
If (p, α) ≡ (1/4, 2),
∂DEUi
∂hi
= 1/2 + 2[ωi(1− 1/4)− 1]
∂DEUi
∂hi
≤ (>)0 ⇐⇒ 1/4 ≤ (>)1− ωi(3/4) ⇐⇒ ωi(3/4) ≤ (>)3/4
In this treatment any γ > 1 would imply that h∗ = 0.
Given equations 26 and 27, using a simple one-parameter probability weighting func-
tion ω(p) = pγ which implies risk aversion in the probability space if γ > 1, there is a
possible range of γ over which
∂DEUi
∂hi
∣∣∣∣
(p=1/8,α=2)
> 0 &
∂DEUi
∂hi
∣∣∣∣
(p=1/4,α=1)
< 0
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This range is found to be γ ∈ [2.15, 2.40], which implies that over this range of risk
aversion in the probability space, h∗ = hmax in the Baseline and LowC-HighS treatment
while h∗ = 0 in the HighC-LowS and HighC-HighS treatment condition.
Rank Dependent Utility
The Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) model developed in Quiggin (1982) generalizes
the expected utility and dual expected utility models by considering transformations over
outcomes as well as probabilities. According to this model, the harvest problem is to maxi-
mize:
RDEUi = ωi(1− p).Ui
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
+ [1− ωi(1− p)].Ui
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[
N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)− αf(hi)
]
(28)
∂RDEUi
∂hi
= [ωi(1− p)]U ′(B)[1−M/N ] + [1− ωi(1− p)]U ′(A)[1−M/N − α] (29)
If p = 0 (Baseline case with no sanctions), equation 29 implies
∂RDEUi
∂hi
> 0 ∀ hi
So the Nash equilibrium harvest level in the baseline is
h∗i = hmax ∀ i ∈ {1, 2...N}
If p = 1/8 and α = 2, equation 29 implies
∂RDEUi
∂hi
≥ (<)0 ⇐⇒ ωi(7/8) ≥ (<) 1
1 + U
′(B)
3U ′(A)
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If p = 1/4 and α = 1, equation 29 implies
∂RDEUi
∂hi
≥ (<)0 ⇐⇒ ωi(3/4) ≥ (<) 1
1 + U
′(B)
U ′(A)
If p = 1/4 and α = 2, equation 29 implies
∂RDEUi
∂hi
≥ (<)0 ⇐⇒ ωi(3/4) ≥ (<) 1
1 + U
′(B)
3U ′(A)
If U ′(B) = U ′(A), i.e. marginal utility is constant, then the model reduces to the Dual
Expected Utility theory model, and if ωi(p) = p ∀p ∈ [0, 1] then it reduces to the Ex-
pected Utility theory model. However, the general case with RDU preferences can ratio-
nalize divergent behavior in the low-probability high-severity and high-probability low-
severity cases with a combination of both probability weighting and a moderate degree of
risk seeking behavior in the experiment.
Relative Effects of Certainty and Severity in CPR game with sanctions
By finding elasticity of harvest hi with respect to the certainty and severity parameter
values, p and alpha,
∂EUi
∂p
= Ui
[
e+hi+
M
N
[ N∑
j=1
(hmax−hj)
]
−αf(hi)
]
−Ui
[
e+hi+
M
N
[ N∑
j=1
(hmax−hj)
]]
(30)
∂EUi
∂p
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ U ′ ≥ 0 (31)
∂EUi
∂α
= −pU ′i
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[ N∑
j=1
(hmax − hj)
]
− αf(hi)
]
hi (32)
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∂EUi
∂α
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ U ′ ≥ 0 (33)
Assuming positive marginal utility, an increase in p or α, reduces expected utility.
−∂EUi
∂p
p
EUi
≥ (≤)− ∂EUi
∂α
α
EUi
(34)
⇐⇒
Ui
[
e+hi+
M
N
[∑N
j=1(hmax−hj)
]]
−Ui
[
e+hi+
M
N
[∑N
j=1(hmax−hj)
]
−αf(hi)
]
αhi
≥ (≤)U ′i
[
e+ hi +
M
N
[∑N
j=1(hmax − hj)
]
− αf(hi)
]
(35)
The term on the left of the equation (L.H.S) is the average change in utility between
the outcomes in the reviewed and not-reviewed state while the term on the right (R.H.S)
is the marginal utility in the reviewed state. If the agent is risk averse (seeking) then U ′′(w) <
(>)0 and L.H.S < (>) R.H.S. Thus, for risk averse agents, conditional on a harvest level
hi, harvest is more responsive to changes in severity of sanctions (α) than to equivalent
changes in certainty of review (p).
Effect of Earnings in CPR game on lottery choice in risk task?
Table 18 shows how accumulated earnings in the extraction game affect the probabil-
ities of making each lottery choice in the risk task. The OLS model used to estimate the
effect of accumulated earnings in the extraction game on lottery choice in the subsequent
risk task is:
Yij = α + βEarningsinCPRGameij +Genderij + Sessionj + ij
In the OLS model, Yij is the observed choice in the risk task numbered from 1 through
6. In the ordered logit model, the predicted outcome is an unobserved latent variable, y∗ij
representing the risk attitude of subject i in session j. Higher y∗ij represents lower risk
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aversion.
Genderij and Sessionj indicate the gender of subject i in session j, and session IDs re-
spectively. None of the choices are statistically significantly affected by accumulated earn-
ings in the extraction game, validating the use of observed lottery choices as estimates of
individuals' risk attitudes.
Table 18: Effect of Earnings in CPR Game on Lottery Choice in Risk Task
OLS Ordered Logit
Coefficients Odds Ratiosa
TotalProfit 0.00372 0.00352
(0.0047) (0.0052)
Male 0.0574 0.116
(0.2274) (0.2517)
Session IDs Yes Yes
Constant 1.480
(2.2595)
Observations (Subjects) 256 256
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
a: Approximate likelihood-ratio test fails to reject proportionality of odds
across response categories: χ2(4) = 2.99; p = 0.5588.
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Instructions
Fixed Quota with Fine
WELCOME!
Please do not talk. If you have a question, please raise your hand and someone will come
over to answer you. The decisions you make in this experiment and your earnings will re-
main anonymous.
TASK 1
In this task, you will be matched with 3 other people to form a group with 4 members.
You will make decisions over many rounds and your group members will be chosen ran-
domly at the start of each round. In each round you will be transferring tokens from a
shared Group Fund into your Individual Fund. You will earn experimental currency units
(ECU) in this task. Your ECUs will be converted into U.S. dollars at the rate 1 ECU =
$0.05 at the end of the task.
Rules
In each round, you start with 10 tokens, worth 1 ECU each, in your Individual Fund.
Your group starts with 40 tokens, worth 2 ECU each, in the Group Fund. The amount in
the Group Fund at the end of each round will be divided equally between all members of
your group. A token in your Individual Fund is worth 1 ECU to you alone. A token in the
Group Fund is worth 0.50 ECU to you and to each other person in the group, for a total
value of 2 ECU in the Group Fund.
Decision
You will decide how many tokens you want to transfer from the Group Fund to your
Individual Fund. You can move any number from 0 to 10 tokens into your Individual Fund.
For example, suppose you transfer 1 token from the Group Fund to your Individual Fund.
Then, the value of the shared Group Fund is reduced by 2 ECU, while the value of your
Individual Fund is increased by 1 ECU.
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Review
You may see numbers highlighted in blue in the box on the top left, marked Your de-
cision will be reviewed if 8-sided die roll is. These numbers are picked randomly for each
group. After you make your decision in each round, the experimenter will roll an 8-sided
die. If the experimenter's die roll matches any one of the numbers displayed, your decision
will be reviewed.
If your decision is reviewed, you pay a fine depending on the number of tokens you
have moved into your Individual Fund. The amount of the fine increases as you transfer
more tokens to your Individual Fund. At the start of each round, you will be informed
whether the amount of the fine equals either the number of tokens you transferred, or
twice that number. The fine (if any) will be subtracted from your earnings in that round.
Your Earnings
Your earnings from both Individual Fund and Group Fund will be shown after each
round. Your earnings in each round will be the value of your Individual Fund plus one-
fourth of the value of the Group Fund minus any fine.
• For instance, suppose you and everyone else in your group takes out 3 tokens each
from the Group Fund and your decision is NOT reviewed. Then, your earnings will
be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) = 13 +
14 = 27 ECU.
• If you and everyone else in your group takes out 3 tokens each, and your group's de-
cision IS reviewed and the fine is the amount you transfer, then your earnings will
be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) - (3)
(Penalty) = 13 +14 - 3 = 24 ECU.
• If you and everyone else in your group takes out 3 tokens each, and your group's de-
cision IS reviewed and the fine is double the amount you transfer, then your earn-
ings will be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund)
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- (2x3) (Penalty) = 13 +14 - 6 = 21 ECU.
Your total earnings in this task will be the sum of your earnings in each round.
Variable Quota with Fine
WELCOME!
Please do not talk. If you have a question, please raise your hand and someone will come
over to answer you. The decisions you make in this experiment and your earnings will re-
main anonymous.
TASK 1
In this task, you will be matched with 3 other people to form a group with 4 members.
You will make decisions over many rounds and your group members will be chosen ran-
domly at the start of each round. In each round you will be transferring tokens from a
shared Group Fund into your Individual Fund. You will earn experimental currency units
(ECU) in this task. Your ECUs will be converted into U.S. dollars at the rate 1 ECU =
$0.05 at the end of the task.
Rules
In each round, you start with 10 tokens, worth 1 ECU each, in your Individual Fund.
Your group starts with 40 tokens, worth 2 ECU each, in the Group Fund. The amount in
the Group Fund at the end of each round will be divided equally between all members of
your group. A token in your Individual Fund is worth 1 ECU to you alone. A token in the
Group Fund is worth 0.50 ECU to you and to each other person in the group, for a total
value of 2 ECU in the Group Fund.
Decision
You will decide how many tokens you want to transfer from the Group Fund to your
Individual Fund. You can move any number from 0 to 10 tokens into your Individual Fund.
For example, suppose you transfer 1 token from the Group Fund to your Individual Fund.
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Then, the value of the shared Group Fund is reduced by 2 ECU, while the value of your
Individual Fund is increased by 1 ECU.
Review
You may see numbers highlighted in blue in the box on the top left, marked Your de-
cision will be reviewed if 8-sided dice roll is. These numbers are picked randomly for each
group. After you make your decision in each round, the experimenter will roll an 8-sided
die. If the experimenter's dice roll matches any one of the numbers displayed, your deci-
sion will be reviewed. If your decision is reviewed, you may pay a fine if you have trans-
ferred more than the average transfer in your Group in the previous round. The average
transfer by your currently assigned group in the previous round will be displayed on your
screen. At the start of each round, you will be informed whether the amount of the fine
equals either the difference between the number of tokens you have transferred and the
average transfer in the previous round, OR twice that difference. The fine (if any) will be
subtracted from your earnings in that round.
Your Earnings
Your earnings from both Individual Fund and Group Fund will be shown after each
round. Your earnings in each round will be the value of your Individual Fund plus one-
fourth of the value of the Group Fund minus any fine.
• For instance, suppose you and everyone else in your group transfers 3 tokens each
from the Group Fund and your decision is NOT reviewed. Then, your earnings will
be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) = 13 +
14 = 27 ECU.
• Suppose your group's average transfer in the previous round is 1 token. If you and
everyone else in your group takes out 3 tokens each, and your group's decision IS
reviewed and the fine is the difference between your transfer and the average transfer
in the previous round, then your earnings will be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) +
[80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) - (3-1) (Penalty) = 13 +14 - 2 = 25 ECU.
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• Suppose your group's average transfer in the previous round is 1 token. If you and
everyone else in your group takes out 3 tokens each, and your group's decision IS
reviewed and the fine is twice the difference between your transfer and the average
transfer in the previous round, then your earnings will be: [10 + 3] (from Individual
Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) - (2x3) (Penalty) = 13 + 14 - 2x(3-1)
= 23 ECU.
Your total earnings in this task will be the sum of your earnings in each round.
Variable Quota with Feebate
WELCOME!
Please do not talk. If you have a question, please raise your hand and someone will come
over to answer you. The decisions you make in this experiment and your earnings will re-
main anonymous.
TASK 1
In this task, you will be matched with 3 other people to form a group with 4 members.
You will make decisions over many rounds and your group members will be chosen ran-
domly at the start of each round. In each round you will be transferring tokens from a
shared Group Fund into your Individual Fund. You will earn experimental currency units
(ECU) in this task. Your ECUs will be converted into U.S. dollars at the rate 1 ECU =
$0.05 at the end of the task.
Rules
In each round, you start with 10 tokens, worth 1 ECU each, in your Individual Fund.
Your group starts with 40 tokens, worth 2 ECU each, in the Group Fund. The amount in
the Group Fund at the end of each round will be divided equally between all members of
your group. A token in your Individual Fund is worth 1 ECU to you alone. A token in the
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Group Fund is worth 0.50 ECU to you and to each other person in the group, for a total
value of 2 ECU in the Group Fund.
Decision
You will decide how many tokens you want to transfer from the Group Fund to your
Individual Fund. You can move any number from 0 to 10 tokens into your Individual Fund.
For example, suppose you transfer 1 token from the Group Fund to your Individual Fund.
Then, the value of the shared Group Fund is reduced by 2 ECU, while the value of your
Individual Fund is increased by 1 ECU.
Review
You may see numbers highlighted in blue in the box on the top left, marked Your de-
cision will be reviewed if 8-sided dice roll is. These numbers are picked randomly for each
group. After you make your decision in each round, the experimenter will roll an 8-sided
die. If the experimenter's dice roll matches any one of the numbers displayed, your deci-
sion will be reviewed. If your decision is reviewed, you may pay a fine if you have trans-
ferred more than the average transfer in your Group in the previous round. You may get
a reward if you have transferred less than the average transfer in your Group in the pre-
vious round. The average transfer by your currently assigned group in the previous round
will be displayed on your screen. At the start of each round, you will be informed whether
the amount of the fine or reward equals either the difference between the number of tokens
you have transferred and the average transfer in the previous round, OR twice that dif-
ference. The fine (if any) will be subtracted while rewards (if any) will be added to your
earnings in that round.
Your Earnings
Your earnings from both Individual Fund and Group Fund will be shown after each
round. Your earnings in each round will be the value of your Individual Fund plus one-
fourth of the value of the Group Fund minus any fine plus any reward.
• For instance, suppose you and everyone else in your group transfers 3 tokens each
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from the Group Fund and your decision is NOT reviewed. Then, your earnings will
be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) = 13 +
14 = 27 ECU.
• Suppose your group's average transfer in the previous round is 1 token. If you and
everyone else in your group takes out 3 tokens each, and your group's decision IS
reviewed and the fine/reward is the difference between your transfer and the average
transfer in the previous round, then your earnings will be: [10 + 3] (from Individual
Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4] (from Group Fund) - (3-1) (Penalty) = 13 + 14 - 2 = 25
ECU.
• Suppose your group's average transfer in the previous round is 3 tokens. If you and
everyone else in your group takes out 1 token each, and your group's decision IS re-
viewed and the fine/reward is twice the difference between your transfer and the av-
erage transfer in the previous round, then your earnings will be: [10 + 1] (from Indi-
vidual Fund) + [80 - (1x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) + (2x2) (Reward) = 11 + 18 +
4 = 33 ECU.
Your total earnings in this task will be the sum of your earnings in each round.
Endogenous Quota with Feebate
WELCOME!
Please do not talk. If you have a question, please raise your hand and someone will come
over to answer you. The decisions you make in this experiment and your earnings will re-
main anonymous.
TASK 1
In this task, you will be matched with 3 other people to form a group with 4 members.
You will make decisions over many rounds and your group members will be chosen ran-
domly at the start of each round. In each round you will be transferring tokens from a
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shared Group Fund into your Individual Fund. You will earn experimental currency units
(ECU) in this task. Your ECUs will be converted into U.S. dollars at the rate 1 ECU =
$0.05 at the end of the task.
Rules
In each round, you start with 10 tokens, worth 1 ECU each, in your Individual Fund.
Your group starts with 40 tokens, worth 2 ECU each, in the Group Fund. The amount in
the Group Fund at the end of each round will be divided equally between all members of
your group. A token in your Individual Fund is worth 1 ECU to you alone. A token in the
Group Fund is worth 0.50 ECU to you and to each other person in the group, for a total
value of 2 ECU in the Group Fund.
Decision
You will decide how many tokens you want to transfer from the Group Fund to your
Individual Fund. You can move any number from 0 to 10 tokens into your Individual Fund.
For example, suppose you transfer 1 token from the Group Fund to your Individual Fund.
Then, the value of the shared Group Fund is reduced by 2 ECU, while the value of your
Individual Fund is increased by 1 ECU.
Review
You may see numbers highlighted in blue in the box on the top left, marked Your de-
cision will be reviewed if 8-sided dice roll is. These numbers are picked randomly for each
group. After you make your decision in each round, the experimenter will roll an 8-sided
die. If the experimenter's dice roll matches any one of the numbers displayed, your deci-
sion will be reviewed. If your decision is reviewed, you will pay a fine if you have trans-
ferred more than the average transfer level in your Group. You will get a reward if you
have transferred less than the average transfer level in your Group. At the start of each
round, you will be informed whether the amount of the fine or reward equals either the
difference between the number of tokens you have transferred and the average transfer
level, OR twice that difference. The fine (if any) will be subtracted while rewards (if any)
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will be added to your earnings in that round.
Your Earnings
Your earnings from both Individual Fund and Group Fund will be shown after each
round. Your earnings in each round will be the value of your Individual Fund plus one-
fourth of the value of the Group Fund minus any fine plus any reward.
• For instance, suppose you and everyone else in your group transfers 3 tokens each
from the Group Fund and your decision is NOT reviewed. Then, your earnings will
be: [10 + 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (3x2x4)]/4 (from Group Fund) = 13 +
14 = 27 ECU.
• Suppose your group's average transfer in the round is 1 token. If you have taken out
3 tokens, and your group's decision IS reviewed and the fine/reward is the difference
between your transfer and the average transfer level, then your earnings will be: [10
+ 3] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (4x2)]/4] (from Group Fund) - (3-1) (Penalty) =
13 + 18 - 2 = 29 ECU.
• Suppose your group's average transfer in the round is 3 tokens. If you have taken out
1 token, and your group's decision IS reviewed and the fine/reward is twice the dif-
ference between your transfer and the average transfer level, then your earnings will
be: [10 + 1] (from Individual Fund) + [80 - (12x2)]/4 (from Group Fund) + (2x(3-
1)) (Reward) = 11 + 14 + 4 = 29 ECU.
Your total earnings in this task will be the sum of your earnings in each round.
Risk Task
TASK 2
This is an individual task. No other person's choice will affect your earnings in this task.
You will be asked to select ONE out of six different options. The six different options are
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listed below. You will see the same options on your screen. You can make your choice by
clicking the button to the left of your preferred option.
Heads Tails
Option 1 $1.80 $1.80
Option 2 $1.40 $2.40
Option 3 $1.00 $3.00
Option 4 $0.60 $3.60
Option 5 $0.20 $4.20
Option 6 $0.00 $4.40
Each option has two possible outcomes that each have an equal chance of occurring.
After you choose your preferred option, the experimenter will flip a coin to determine the
outcome from your chosen option. For example, if you choose Option 3 and the coin toss is
Heads, you will earn $1.00 from this task. If coin toss is Tails, you get $3.00. Your earning
from this task will be added to your earnings from Task 1 to determine your total earnings
for this session.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
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Results Without Controls
Table 19: RE GLS without Controls
Quota Regime Fixed Quota Variable Quota Variable Quota Endogenous Quota
Fines Only Fines Only Fee-bate Fee-bate
Low-P#High-S (1) -0.455 0.172 -0.659∗ -0.147
(0.3176) (0.2218) (0.2643) (0.2864)
High-P#Low-S (2) -1.537∗∗∗ -0.256 -1.878∗∗∗ -1.453∗∗∗
(0.2789) (0.2157) (0.3283) (0.3377)
(2) - (1) -1.082∗∗∗ -0.428*** -1.219∗∗∗ -1.306∗∗∗
(0.2524) (0.1561) (0.2820) (0.2517)
High-P#High-S -1.870∗∗∗ -0.167 -1.970∗∗∗ -1.293∗∗
(0.3412) (0.2472) (0.3164) (0.4119)
Constant 6.413∗∗∗ 6.227∗∗∗ 6.673∗∗∗ 5.986∗∗∗
(0.3158) (0.3159) (0.2764) (0.3694)
Observations 1600 1200 1200 1120
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Effects by All & Risk Averse Subjects
Table 20: RE GLS: Effects on Harvest on All & on Risk Averse Subjects
Quota Regime QR1 QR2 QR3 QR4 QR1 QR2 QR3 QR4
Subjects (All/Risk-Averse) All All All All RA RA RA RA
Deterrence Factors
Low-P#High-S (1) -0.681∗ -0.489 -1.008∗∗ -0.877∗ -0.949∗∗ -0.509 -1.393∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗
(0.3174) (0.3105) (0.3365) (0.3968) (0.3416) (0.4539) (0.4159) (0.4444)
High-P#Low-S (2) -1.630∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗ -1.774∗∗∗ -1.999∗∗∗ -1.821∗∗∗ -0.965∗ -1.826∗∗∗ -2.214∗∗∗
(0.2870) (0.2786) (0.3630) (0.4188) (0.3326) (0.4176) (0.4076) (0.5072)
High-P#High-S -2.102∗∗∗ -1.095∗ -2.427∗∗∗ -2.490∗∗∗ -2.482∗∗∗ -1.375∗ -2.477∗∗∗ -2.814∗∗∗
(0.3485) (0.4615) (0.5268) (0.6216) (0.4044) (0.6172) (0.6597) (0.7471)
Risk Seeking 0.178 0.154 0.253∗ 0.364∗
(0.1457) (0.1810) (0.1007) (0.1521)
Harvest Quota 0.321∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.0556) (0.0468) (0.0772) (0.0572)
Reviewedt−1 -1.304∗∗∗ -0.180 0.0784 -0.237 -1.252∗∗∗ -0.167 0.0483 0.202
(0.2494) (0.1539) (0.2374) (0.3053) (0.2919) (0.1891) (0.2130) (0.3414)
Finet−1 0.162∗∗∗ 0.104+ 0.172∗∗ 0.0902 0.175∗∗∗ 0.0568 0.128 0.0906
(0.0283) (0.0631) (0.0593) (0.0862) (0.0350) (0.0707) (0.1030) (0.0947)
Rewardt−1 -0.0481 -0.0718 -0.0343 -0.0430
(0.0559) (0.0931) (0.0630) (0.0872)
Accumulated Earningst−1 0.0193
∗ 0.0144 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗ 0.0240∗∗ 0.0251∗ 0.0342∗∗ 0.0238+
(0.0082) (0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0108) (0.0087) (0.0099) (0.0111) (0.0122)
Period -0.453∗ -0.293 -1.023∗∗∗ -0.608∗ -0.580∗∗ -0.529∗ -0.753∗∗ -0.501
(0.1903) (0.2430) (0.2429) (0.2650) (0.2015) (0.2282) (0.2812) (0.3052)
Demog. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session IDs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1520 1140 1140 1064 1140 722 741 608
Subjects 80 60 60 56 60 38 39 32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Demographic Summary Statistics
Table 21: Demographic Characteristics of Experimental Sample
Number Proportion
Gender
Male 77 30.08%
Female 178 69.53%
Other 1 0.39%
Race
Asian 46 17.97%
Black or African American 161 62.89%
Hispanic 13 5.08%
Multiracial 8 3.13%
Prefer Not to Answer 6 2.34%
White or Caucasian 22 8.59%
Age
18-20 164 64.06%
21-23 49 28.13%
24-26 12 4.69%
27-29 3 1.17%
30-35 3 1.17%
Above 35 2 0.78%
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Effects of Sanctions and Rewards by Subject Type
Table 22: Conditional Effects: Heterogeneities by Agent Type
Fixed Quota Variable Quota Variable Quota Endogenous Quota
Fines Only Fines Only Feebate Feebate
Low-P#High-S -0.465 0.275 -2.454∗∗∗ -0.269
(0.4738) (0.4027) (0.7457) (0.5902)
High-P#Low-S -1.662∗∗ -0.243 -2.386∗∗∗ -0.439
(0.5730) (0.5889) (0.5159) (0.7167)
High-P#High-S -1.646∗∗ -0.184 -2.584∗∗∗ -1.703∗∗
(0.5438) (0.6714) (0.7262) (0.6585)
FreeRider 0.609 0.264 1.644∗∗∗ 3.393∗∗∗
(0.4335) (0.3495) (0.4438) (0.6735)
Altruist -2.032∗∗ -1.453∗∗ -1.628+ -0.00406
(0.6657) (0.5013) (0.8403) (0.7100)
ConditionalCooperator -0.248 -0.123 0.699∗ 1.472∗∗
(0.3006) (0.3097) (0.3080) (0.5250)
Low-P#High-S × FreeRider -1.947∗ -1.420∗ 1.054 -2.337∗∗
(0.7621) (0.6031) (0.7850) (0.7868)
Low-P#High-S × Altruist 4.330∗∗∗ -0.428 1.892∗∗ 0.493
(1.1354) (0.5505) (0.7212) (0.7345)
Low-P#High-S × ConditionalCooperator 0.197 -0.701 1.522+ -0.233
(0.5633) (0.4605) (0.8025) (0.6828)
High-P#Low-S × FreeRider -1.090 -1.575∗ -0.646 -3.825∗∗∗
(0.7671) (0.6686) (0.8314) (0.9105)
High-P#Low-S × Altruist 3.012∗∗∗ 0.416 3.690∗∗∗ 0.440
(0.7850) (0.7117) (0.5416) (0.7536)
High-P#Low-S × ConditionalCooperator 0.359 -0.307 1.022+ -1.611∗
(0.6930) (0.6177) (0.6023) (0.8027)
High-P#High-S × FreeRider -2.423∗∗ -1.802∗∗ -1.503+ -2.724∗∗
(0.8577) (0.6694) (0.8196) (0.8302)
High-P#High-S × Altruist 4.260∗∗∗ 0.211 2.749∗∗∗ 1.140+
(0.9217) (0.9443) (0.4730) (0.5893)
High-P#High-S × ConditionalCooperator 0.0107 -0.994 0.679 -0.555
(0.6787) (0.6213) (0.7092) (0.8618)
Baseline Withdrawal 0.585∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.0872) (0.0952) (0.1003) (0.1160)
Risk Seeking 0.0999 -0.0308 0.172∗ 0.387∗∗
(0.1148) (0.1062) (0.0713) (0.1237)
Reviewed in t-1 -1.293∗∗∗ -0.164 -0.00355 -0.170
(0.2507) (0.1460) (0.2384) (0.2916)
Harvest Quota 0.328∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.0548) (0.0495)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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6.2 Appendix B
Map of African Elephant Range and Population Density
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Results for Different Regions
Table 23: Results Excluding West Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log_eleph_adj log_eleph_adj log_eleph_adj log_eleph_adj
CBNRM 0.753 0.753 1.468 1.468∗
(1.567) (0.860) (1.336) (0.822)
CITES Ban -1.066 -1.066∗ -1.018 -1.018∗∗
(0.738) (0.512) (0.710) (0.455)
CBNRM#CITESBan 1.302∗∗∗ 1.302∗ 0.469 0.469∗
(0.469) (0.689) (0.503) (0.222)
CBNRM#Fractionalization -1.810 -1.810 -1.112 -1.112
(1.910) (1.433) (1.645) (1.027)
CBNRM#TrophyHuntingEleph -0.00564 -0.00564 -0.863 -0.863∗∗∗
(0.559) (0.437) (0.535) (0.246)
Fraser Summary Index of Governance 0.184 0.184 0.0982 0.0982
(0.240) (0.239) (0.254) (0.146)
Log(GNIpc) 0.628 0.628 0.328 0.328
(0.934) (0.575) (1.010) (0.529)
Protected Area -0.0579 -0.0579 -0.121∗ -0.121∗∗
(0.0741) (0.0458) (0.0662) (0.0503)
Forest Rent 0.0756 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0205 0.0205
(0.0513) (0.0223) (0.0517) (0.0294)
Area Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
SEs clustered at country level NO YES NO YES
Surveys included All All Reliable only Reliable only
Observations 426 426 329 329
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.209
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Results for Countries in Southern Africa only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log_eleph_adj log_eleph_adj log_eleph_adj log_eleph_adj
CBNRM 2.263 2.263∗ 2.808 2.808
(2.326) (1.110) (2.163) (1.684)
CITES Ban -1.111 0 -0.493 -1.611
(1.503) (.) (1.472) (1.183)
CBNRM#CITESBan 2.270∗ 2.270∗∗ 0.485 0.485
(1.331) (0.589) (1.225) (0.628)
CBNRM#Fractionalization 2.005 2.005 1.694 1.694∗∗
(3.748) (1.039) (2.900) (0.581)
CBNRM#TrophyHuntingEleph -3.562 -3.562∗∗∗ -3.928 -3.928∗∗
(2.329) (0.637) (2.533) (1.488)
Fraser Summary Index of Governance -0.592 -0.592∗∗ -0.141 -0.141
(0.424) (0.162) (0.397) (0.235)
Log(GNIpc) 1.759 1.759 2.943 2.943
(3.399) (1.739) (4.486) (3.505)
Protected Area -0.167 -0.167∗∗ -0.185∗∗ -0.185∗∗
(0.122) (0.0574) (0.0917) (0.0503)
Forest Rent -0.461 -0.461 -0.0416 -0.0416
(0.483) (0.361) (0.527) (0.544)
Area Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
SEs clustered at country level NO YES NO YES
Surveys included All All Reliable only Reliable only
Observations 223 223 192 192
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.347
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Results for Unadjusted Log of Elephant Counts
Table 25: Results with unadjusted log(elephant counts)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log_eleph log_eleph log_eleph log_eleph
CBNRM 1.286 1.286 1.437 1.437∗
(1.455) (1.152) (1.245) (0.700)
CITES Ban -0.762 -0.762 -0.863 -0.863∗∗
(0.658) (0.455) (0.662) (0.368)
CBNRM#CITESBan 0.945∗∗ 0.945 0.0212 0.0212
(0.402) (0.675) (0.414) (0.268)
CBNRM#Fractionalization -2.451 -2.451 -1.350 -1.350
(1.769) (1.592) (1.533) (0.951)
CBNRM#TrophyHuntingEleph -0.155 -0.155 -0.782∗ -0.782∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.375) (0.470) (0.217)
Fraser Summary Index of Governance 0.0616 0.0616 0.184 0.184
(0.225) (0.218) (0.233) (0.152)
Log(GNIpc) 1.000 1.000∗ 1.052 1.052∗
(0.847) (0.540) (0.878) (0.603)
Protected Area -0.0649 -0.0649 -0.105∗ -0.105∗∗
(0.0677) (0.0564) (0.0605) (0.0400)
Forest Rent 0.0810∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ 0.0259 0.0259
(0.0472) (0.0181) (0.0478) (0.0250)
Area Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
SEs clustered at country level NO YES NO YES
Surveys included All All Reliable only Reliable only
Observations 428 428 324 324
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.226
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Alternative Specifications
Table 26: Alternative Specifications: Testing for Interaction of CBNRM and CITES Ban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
CBNRM -0.0883 0.158 0.0723 -0.545∗ -0.580 -0.117
(0.173) (0.209) (0.167) (0.294) (0.370) (0.221)
CITES Ban -0.383∗ -0.616∗∗ -0.785∗∗ -0.129 -1.404∗ -0.754
(0.222) (0.288) (0.315) (0.430) (0.740) (0.505)
CBNRM#CITESBan 0.258 0.312 0.396∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 1.167∗ 0.168
(0.172) (0.225) (0.223) (0.413) (0.595) (0.400)
Fraser Index of Governance -0.472∗∗∗ 0.119 0.0755
(0.145) (0.242) (0.187)
Log(GNIpc) 1.036∗∗∗ 0.597 0.144
(0.258) (0.813) (0.585)
Protected Area (% of land area) 0.0246 -0.0190 -0.0404
(0.0173) (0.0557) (0.0356)
Forest Rent (% of GDP) 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0498 0.0168
(0.0349) (0.0501) (0.0261)
Area FEs NO YES YES NO YES YES
Constant 5.907∗∗∗ 6.449∗∗∗ 6.530∗∗∗ -2.483 1.064 5.287
(0.444) (0.412) (0.380) (2.283) (7.510) (5.391)
Observations 1136 1136 720 459 459 350
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.065 0.110 0.168
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Columns 3 and 6 restrict the sample to reliable surveys only.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 27: Alternative Specifications: Testing for interaction of CBNRM and Fractionaliza-
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
CBNRM 0.315 0.461 -0.0981 -0.763 1.616 0.841
(0.346) (0.400) (0.368) (0.747) (1.416) (0.970)
CBNRM#Fractionalization -0.381 -0.159 0.501 0.840 -2.326 -1.139
(0.477) (0.533) (0.479) (1.101) (2.033) (1.341)
Fraser Index of Governance -0.197 0.238 0.0228
(0.201) (0.291) (0.151)
Log(GNIpc) 0.487∗∗ 1.623∗∗ 0.562
(0.212) (0.730) (0.544)
Protected Area (% of land area) 0.0327∗ -0.0392 -0.0582
(0.0178) (0.0752) (0.0495)
Forest Rent (% of GDP) 0.0701∗∗ 0.0668 0.0518
(0.0300) (0.0421) (0.0323)
Area FEs NO YES YES NO YES YES
Constant 6.015∗∗∗ 6.739∗∗∗ 6.206∗∗∗ 0.991 -8.645 1.485
(0.460) (0.358) (0.356) (2.093) (6.888) (4.694)
Observations 1132 1132 719 459 459 350
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.053 0.068 0.165
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Columns 3 and 6 restrict the sample to reliable surveys only.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
90
Table 28: Alternative Specifications: Testing for interaction of CBNRM and Governance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1) Log(Eleph+1)
CBNRM -2.051∗ -1.424 -2.598∗ -2.005∗ -1.636 -0.324
(1.107) (1.450) (1.571) (1.192) (1.713) (1.234)
Fraser Index of Governance -0.415∗∗∗ -0.160 -0.325 -0.314∗ -0.0174 -0.0664
(0.155) (0.212) (0.204) (0.166) (0.221) (0.191)
CBNRM#Governance 0.318∗ 0.272 0.419∗ 0.292 0.249 0.0567
(0.175) (0.214) (0.236) (0.187) (0.254) (0.193)
Log(GNIpc) 0.453∗∗ 1.145 0.342
(0.222) (0.752) (0.594)
Protected Area (% of land area) 0.0272 0.00638 -0.0370
(0.0175) (0.0678) (0.0356)
Forest Rent (% of GDP) 0.0625∗∗ 0.0570 0.0484
(0.0307) (0.0406) (0.0320)
Area FEs NO YES YES NO YES YES
Constant 8.255∗∗∗ 7.617∗∗∗ 6.975∗∗∗ 1.882 -4.325 3.367
(0.794) (1.071) (1.175) (2.239) (6.881) (5.453)
Observations 551 551 405 459 459 350
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.126 0.064 0.162
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Columns 3 and 6 restrict the sample to reliable surveys only.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6.3 Appendix C
Instructions
General Instructions
• Please do not talk among yourselves during this research study. You will participate
in computerized tasks. Your decisions in these tasks will determine your earnings.
• These tasks do not require you to have knowledge of correct responses. Please
make your decisions according to what you would like to choose.
• You have instructions for each task. After you have completed your decisions, one of
the tasks that you have participated in will be used to determine your earnings from
today's research study.
• Your decisions and your earnings will remain anonymous. No other person partici-
pating in this study will be told of your decision or your earnings.
• Please raise your hand if at any point you have any questions, and one of the re-
searchers will come to you and answer your question in private.
• After you have finished the computerized tasks, you will be asked to fill out a ques-
tionnaire. After filling out the questionnaire, if you have your electricity bill avail-
able, please hand it over to one of the researchers to receive an additional amount of
money.
Task 1
In this Task, you have QR 150 allocated to you. Out of this allocation, you can choose
how much, if any, to transfer to Qatar Charity.
Please choose any amount you wish to transfer by entering the number. Your earnings
from this task will be QR 150 minus the amount you decide to transfer to Qatar Charity.
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Task 2
Please choose ONE out of the six Options available on your screen. Each Option rep-
resents the chance of earning one of two possible amounts. You can choose an Option by
clicking on the box to the left of your preferred option. After you have made your choices,
the computer will pick either the orange or the blue column at random. Your earnings
from this task will be the number corresponding to the option you have chosen, and the
column chosen by the computer.
For example, if you choose Option 5, and the computer picks ORANGE, your earnings
from this task will be QR 82.
Task 3
Please choose either the ORANGE or the BLUE column for each decision row. In each
row, you choose between a smaller amount of money to be paid sooner and a larger amount
of money to be paid later.
Please click the appropriate box to make your choice. After you have made your deci-
sion, the computer will randomly select one of the decision rows at random. Your choice
for that decision row will determine your earnings for this task.
For example, if the computer chooses decision row 4 at random, and you have selected
the ORANGE column in decision row 4, you will receive QR 117 today. If the computer
chooses decision row 15 at random, and you have selected the BLUE column in decision
row 15, you will receive QR 148 in 4 months.
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Risk and Time Preference Choices
Table 29: Risk Task: Payoffs and Implied Intervals of Risk Aversion
x1 x2 EV r (U(x) = x1−r/(1− r); r 6= 1)
138 138 138 r ≤ 3.56549
124 160 142 1.9168 ≤ r ≤ 3.56549
110 182 146 0.719315 ≤ r ≤ 1.9168
96 204 150 0.51193 ≤ r ≤ 0.719315
82 226 154 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.51193
68 240 154 r ≤ 0
Table 30: Time Preference Task: Payoffs and Implied Discount Rates
x1 x2 Monthly interest rate Monthly δ
117 118 0.284900285 0.997167124
117 126 2.564102564 0.975599956
117 133 4.558404558 0.95817479
117 140 6.552706553 0.941931401
117 148 8.831908832 0.92464434
117 155 10.82621083 0.910510003
117 162 12.82051282 0.897202102
117 169 14.81481481 0.884639619
117 176 16.80911681 0.872752426
117 184 19.08831909 0.859915967
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Table 31: Outcome donation: Heterogeneous Effects Full Sample
(1) (2)
Nationals Nationals with Controls
Religious Message 18.70∗∗ 21.80∗∗
(9.453) (10.38)
National Identity Message 11.79 10.03
(9.512) (10.76)
Qatari National=1 16.61∗∗ 18.40∗∗
(7.865) (9.219)
Religious Message × Qatari National=1 -2.602 -0.433
(14.42) (16.33)
National Identity Message × Qatari National=1 -0.609 1.466
(14.49) (15.71)
Present Bias=1 -7.164
(7.421)
Female=1 6.368
(7.825)
Non-Muslim=1 -48.11∗∗∗
(10.36)
Villa Resident=1 -9.271
(7.822)
Education 4.516
(3.102)
Constant 39.40∗∗∗ 30.53∗∗
(5.463) (12.08)
Observations 219 202
R2 0.052 0.084
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 32: MEs of Treatment by Nationality
(1) (2)
Nationals Nationals with Controls
Religious Message
National=0 18.70∗∗ 21.80∗∗
(9.453) (10.38)
National=1 16.10 21.36∗
(10.89) (12.46)
National Identity Message
National=0 11.79 10.03
(9.512) (10.76)
National=1 11.18 11.50
(10.94) (12.25)
Observations 219 202
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 33: Outcome donation: Heterogeneous Effects QU Sample
(1) (2)
Nationals Nationals with Controls
Religious Message 21.54∗∗ 25.30∗∗
(9.029) (10.08)
National Identity Message 19.12∗∗ 16.55
(9.172) (10.11)
Qatari National=1 22.99∗∗∗ 23.25∗∗∗
(6.999) (8.766)
Religious Message × Qatari National=1 -5.440 -3.069
(14.15) (16.16)
National Identity Message × Qatari National=1 -7.940 -4.326
(14.28) (15.28)
Present Bias=1 -4.891
(7.635)
Female=1 7.995
(7.842)
Non-Muslim=1 -39.68∗∗∗
(9.011)
Villa Resident=1 -6.396
(7.560)
Education 4.838
(3.078)
Constant 33.03∗∗∗ 20.49∗
(4.114) (11.41)
Observations 206 191
R2 0.078 0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 34: MEs of Treatment by Nationality
(1) (2)
Nationals Nationals with Controls
Religious Message
National=0 21.54∗∗ 25.30∗∗
(9.029) (10.08)
National=1 16.10 22.23∗
(10.89) (12.44)
National Identity Message
National=0 19.12∗∗ 16.55
(9.172) (10.11)
National=1 11.18 12.22
(10.95) (12.24)
Observations 206 191
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 11: Histogram of Donation Amounts
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Figure 12: CDF of Donation Amounts
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